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RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF “GOOD GOVERNANCE” REFORM
Chantal Thomas*
* * *
The "Weberianism" of the modern age derives from the influence of three
theoretical concepts in Weber's work. First, Weber described the development
of "logically formal rationality" in governance as central to the rise of Western
capitalist democracy. Second, Weber posited that Protestant religious ethics
had helped to promote certain economic behaviors associated with
contemporary capitalism. Third, Weber identified the rise of bureaucratic
governance, as the primary means of realizing logically formal rationality, as
distinctly modern.
This essay examines the influence of these basic insights on discourse on legal
reform in developing countries. The prioritization of legal and institutional
reforms to achieve "good governance" seems to be part of a larger intellectual
shift to the problems and challenges of "governance" in a globalizing world.
Transmitters of Weberian analysis in this milieu, however, have at times elided
important nuances in Weber's own thought -- nuances that, if incorporated,
might have significant implications within development discourse.
The paper's objectives are: first, to conduct an intellectual history that shows
how one of the greatest sociologists influenced an increasingly important area
of law reform in the age of globalization; second, to surface critiques arising
within that field of law reform; and third, to suggest that there may be some
connection between the two. In that sense, the paper seeks to make a
contribution to two discourses: to enrich the study of the history of legal thought
the reception of an important thinker has shaped contemporary law and policy
in a relatively understudied field in the academy; and at the same time to
underscore and contextualize policy critiques that have arisen in an
increasingly important field of practice.

* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, ct343@cornell.edu. Parts I, II.A. and
II.B. were published as Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Legal
Reform: A Reassessment with Implications for Law and Development, 15 MINN.
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RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

The present age and its presentation of itself is
dominantly ‘Weberian.’1
Weber’s renowned comparative studies from his
Protestant Ethic [The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism] to his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Economy
and Society] have yet to be understood in their true light.
They are much more than they seem or are generally
understood
to
be,
comparative
sociological
investigations against a background of the history of
Western civilization and culture. In a sense which many
overlook, they are prophecies and warnings –
prophecies about the menacing shape of things to come,
warnings against the further expansion of the domain of
conscienceless reason, even in the name of the most
noble ideals… The noblest impulses only too often gave
rise to the most baleful consequences.2

The “Weberianism” of the modern age derives from the
influence of three theoretical concepts in Weber’s work.
First, Weber described the development of “logically formal
rationality” in governance as central to the rise of Western
capitalist democracy. Second, Weber posited that Protestant
religious ethics had helped to promote certain economic
behaviors associated with contemporary capitalism. Third,
Weber identified the rise of bureaucratic governance, as the
primary means of realizing logically formal rationality, as
distinctly modern.
This essay examines the influence of these basic
insights on discourse on legal reform in developing
countries. Involvement in the politics of his native Germany
aside, Weber himself wrote mostly from the perspective of
ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE. McIntyre’s comment situates Weber
within a debate between naturalist and positivist philosophy, which this paper
briefly discusses in section A.3. infra.
2 Benjamin Nelson, Discussion on Industrialization and Capitalism, in STAMMER ED.,
MAX WEBER AND SOCIOLOGY, pp.17-18 (cited in Alan Sica, Rationalization and
culture, CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 54, 54 (2000)).
1
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an historian, seeking to explain the difference between
countries rather than to propose reforms for change within
them. Though descriptive rather than prescriptive, Weber’s
analyses have exerted wide-ranging influence on American
scholars and administrators who concern themselves with
causing developing countries to acquire the affluence of the
modern West.
This work originated in the social sciences, and is
characterized in particular by the work of Talcott Parsons
(with “Structural-Functionalist” sociology) and W.W.
Rostow (with “Modernization Theory”), both writing in the
mid-twentieth century.
Structural-Functionalism and
Modernization Theory helped generate a particular set of
views, collected under the rubric of “Law and Development
Theory” about the kinds of legal reforms necessary to
facilitate development, formulated in the 1950s and 1960s.
The tenets of Law and Development Theory have in turn
helped to shape the basis in the last two decades for a
renewed attention within influential development
institutions to the importance legal reform referred to as
“Good Governance Policy.” The prioritization of legal and
institutional reforms to achieve “good governance” seems to
be part of a larger intellectual shift to the problems and
challenges of “governance” in a globalizing world.
Transmitters of Weberian analysis in this milieu,
however, have elided important nuances in Weber’s own
thought -- nuances that, if incorporated, might have
significant implications within development discourse.
These elisions, which I term the “Three Theoretical Shortcuts,”
may have contributed to a set of conceptual tendencies that
have led to flawed theory and policy on legal reform in
developing countries.
These tendencies or Theoretical
Shortcuts are: an attraction to universalistic, “one-size-fitsall” reform objectives; an emphasis on “values” as a
determinant of economic growth and a target of reform
4
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efforts; and a failure to appreciate the irrationalities that
arise endemically out of the bureaucratization of
government, as well as the tenuousness of democratic
processes therein.
Over the past few decades in the social sciences, a
new wave of Weberian scholarship (the “New Weberians”)
has arisen that seeks to repair some of the distortions in the
earlier reception of Weber.3 An early and prominent
example of this alternative Weberianism arose from the
work of three sociologists, Jere Cohen, Lawrence Hazelrigg,
and Whitney Pope (hereinafter “Cohen et al.”), in a strident
1975 critique of the “Parsonized” understanding of Weber.
In “Deparsonizing Weber,” Cohen et al. took Parsons to task
for downplaying Weber’s understanding of power relations
in society, as well as Weber’s acknowledgment of the
importance of material dynamics, in favor of a reading that
coincided with classical liberalism’s relative neutrality with
respect to the role of government, and in favor of an
overweening emphasis on “ideals” as a determinant of
economic growth. A later strain of alternative Weberian
analysis, unlike Cohen et al., accepts the methodological
focus on ideals, but seeks to situate the idealist analysis
within an appreciation of power relations. This second
strain of analysis, reflected for example in the work of
Kieran Allen, Sven Eliasson, Nicholas Gane and Peter
Lansmann, inherits a sensibility from the line of critical
theorists beginning with the Frankfurt school.
At the same time, in the field of development policy,
“good governance” policies have come under increasing
See, e.g., Peter Lansmann, Power, Politics and Legitimation, in CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO WEBER 83, 86 (2000): “One obstacle to understanding is the
peculiar reception history of Weber’s work. Much of post-Second WorldWar
social science has worked with a rather simplified and misleading account of
Weber’s intentions, and often, until very recently, as a result of the incomplete
character of translation, with a fragmentary knowledge of his work.
Consequently, Weber’s central concepts have frequently been assimilated to the
language of the modern social sciences in an uncritical manner.”
3
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scrutiny and criticism by scholars (the “Good Governance
Scholars”). In recent years, good governance policy has come
under scrutiny from a variety of commentators, whom I dub
the Good Governance Scholars: I use this term to include
groundbreaking critical thinkers such as James Gathii, Kerry
Rittich, and Alvaro Santos, as well as the sophisticated
empirical and economic analysis of scholars such as Kevin
Davis, Katarina Pistor, and Michael Trebilcock. These Good
Governance Scholars have raised a variety of concerns about
the efficacy of the prevailing agenda of international “best
practices” in legal reform for developing countries.
Though the New Weberians and the Good
Governance Scholars appear to be largely mutually
unknown, in fact their conclusions often appear to mirror
each other. Many of the current policy flaws in good
governance reforms as described by the Good Governance
Scholars seem to reflect the flaws in the mid-twentieth
century reception of Weberian social science as revealed by
the New Weberians.
The objective is to define an interface between two
bodies of critical reappraisal: that concerning Weber (but not
addressing law and development), and that concerning law
and development (but not addressing Weber).
The
sociologists, political scientists and philosophers who have
called for a new understanding of Weber have not have
considered the impact of their critiques on the field of law
and development. At the same time, critics of law and
development and governance reforms have perceived
shortcomings that track and reflect some of the kinds of
conclusions reached by the re-readers of Weber.
This “mirror image” between the respective critiques
of the New Weberians and the Good Governance Scholars
suggests that there may be a relationship between the flawed
transmission of Weberian theory, on the one hand, and some
of the programmatic limitations of good governance legal
6
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reform directives, on the other.
In defining this interface between Good Governance
Scholars and New Weberians, this article follows and seeks
to merge two trails established by two prior works of legal
scholarship: David Trubek’s “Max Weber on Law and
Capitalism,” and Duncan Kennedy’s “The Disenchantment
of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in
the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal
Thought.” Trubek’s article, written in 1972, explains Weber
as an intellectual precursor of contemporary law and
development theory; written ahead of the bulk of New
Weberian scholarship, it anticipates and briefly engages a
critical re-reading of Weber.4 Kennedy’s article, written in
2004, delves more squarely into the New Weberian project in
the humanities and social sciences of critically reassessing
the reception of Weberian theory; written as a general
exposition of Weber’s role in contemporary legal thought,
however, it does not apply itself to the problematique of law
and development. Inspired by both works, the objective of
this paper is to understand how a critical re-reading of
Weber might impact on the particular field of law and
development.
The point of the paper is not to argue that
contemporary law and development policy should seek
fidelity to Weberian thought. Rather, the paper’s objectives
are: first, to conduct an intellectual history that shows how
one of the greatest sociologists influenced an increasingly
important area of law reform in the age of globalization;
second, to surface critiques arising within that field of law
See David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 720, 737 n.31, also discussed below. In Trubek’s other canonical law and
development essay, David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement,
1974 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, Trubek and his co-author Galanter articulate many
of the criticisms whose intellectual history it is the objective of this paper to
delineate. See infra, Part II.D., for an explication of the relationship between the
criticisms of Trubek & Galanter and the Theoretical Shortcuts posited by this
essay.
4
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reform; and third, to suggest that there may be some
connection between the two. In that sense, the paper seeks
to make a contribution to two discourses: to enrich the study
of the history of legal thought the reception of an important
thinker has shaped contemporary law and policy in a
relatively understudied field in the academy; and at the
same time to underscore and contextualize policy critiques
that have arisen in an increasingly important field of
practice.
* * *
Part I of the paper provides an Introduction of
Weber’s best-known analyses – the ideal typology of systems
of governance; the association of Calvinist religious values
with capitalistic economic growth; and the centrality of
bureaucracy. Following the Introduction, this paper will
pursue in Part II its project of re-reading Weber against law
and development discourse. Part II will describe the
trajectory of Weberian analysis from mid-century U.S. social
science scholarship to U.S. foreign policies of the same era.
In United States scholarship of the twentieth century, Talcott
Parsons was arguably the most significant of Weber’s
interlocutors. Parsons’s analysis emerged in a particular
moment in mid-century social science in the United States.
Though Parsons embedded his theory in an elaborate
methodological framework in an extensive body of
scholarship, he also consciously fashioned a theory that
sought to influence not only scholarly debates but also the
policy and practice of an ascendant foreign-affairs focus in
the newly potent United States government. Parsons’ theory
featured core analytical points which channeled Weber’s
analysis into a discourse and debate that was distinctly Cold
War. Parsons’ analysis influenced subsequent writers such
as W.W. Rostow, whose own application of the Weber8
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Parsons approach further simplified it for deployment in the
foreign-affairs goal of the U.S. to limit the influence of
socialist and nationalist politics in developing states.
Rostow’s analysis in turn shaped the later generation of
“good governance” policy, much more separated from
scholarship and again much more streamlined in its
ideological and practical sources and intended effects. Part
II will consider this particular strain of Weberian discourse
in the light of other, competing accounts of Weber’s work
within U.S. social science scholarship.
Finally, Part II will reflect on the significance of the
second set of Weberian accounts on the first. In particular,
the paper will try to extend these alternative accounts that
have arisen within the academy to the law and policy
framework of good governance that is the successor of the
Parsonized account. In this section, the paper will observe
that, for a variety of reasons, this alternative strain of
scholarship disconnected from U.S. foreign policy, leaving
the field open for the Parsons-Rostow account that
ultimately helped to generate, or at least legitimate,
contemporary good governance policy. Good governance is
highly influential in contemporary law and policy in the
international economic order, particularly in the
development context. As such, a critical engagement with
the intellectual antecedents of the framework takes on not
only scholarly significance but also practical and
programmatic significance. In Part III, the paper briefly
offers some conclusions and suggestions for reform.
Although it begins by recounting the influence of
Weberian thought in good governance analysis, this paper’s
ambitions extend beyond intellectual history. Rather, the
paper aims to mount a “legitimation critique” from the
platform of this revisionist account. The argument is that
good governance analysis, and the law and policy reforms
9
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that result from it, gain an important source of legitimation
in this most influential of modern social theorists. In this
sense, critical engagement with the intellectual origins of
contemporary good governance analysis generates
important implications not only for the concrete
programmatic dimensions of good governance law reforms
and for the possibility of alternative kinds of approaches to
reform, but for their analytical legitimacy.
PART I. Introduction: Weber’s Central Insights
Weber’s most influential analyses relating to the role
of governance and growth are: (1) the analysis, in Part I of
his Economy and Society, of three “ideal types” of rule –
traditional, charismatic, and “rationalen,” with “rationalen”
being the type of rule characteristic of modern Western
society; (2) the analysis, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, of the way in which religious values supported
the development of capitalistic practices in Western Europe,
through the association of religious virtue with capitalistic
practices such as saving, investment and profit, and having
been missing in certain other societies, such as China and
India, that attained significant levels of technology but did
not undergo industrialization; and (3) the rise of
bureaucracy as the expression of both the “disenchantment”
modern society inherent in its drive towards rationalization,
and its “reenchantment” through the establishment and
inculcation of relationships between groups vying for
power.
Theoretical Insight #1: “Ideal Types” of Governance
Weber in fact was trained as an economist, and so his
work which was ultimately deemed a cornerstone of
sociology often investigated the social dimensions of
10
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economic activity.5
Weber employed a methodology of “ideal types” in
his sociological history, seeking to identify and categorize
societies on the basis of an heuristic framework. Though
elements of each category were present in every society,
Weber believed that such a framework would aid in
understanding the distinctive qualities of particular societies
as well as their relationship to each other. Particularly
influential was Weber’s framework of systems of
governance6 – what Weber called Herrschaft.
In his historical and comparative sociology, Weber
sought to explain why “the modern system of industrial (or
‘bourgeois’) capitalism emerged in Europe, but not other
parts of the world... European law had unique features
which made it more conductive to capitalism than were the
legal systems of other civilizations.”7
5 Richard Swedberg, Max Weber as an Economist and as a Sociologist: Towards a
Fuller Understanding of Weber's View of Economics, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY (1999).
6 In employing the term “governance” here, the objective is to use a term that in
contemporary English that can describe modes of socially authoritative decisionmaking without necessarily interjecting an explicitly normative sense of whether
they are politically valid or desirable. Thus the emerging literature on
governance approaches the topic from a range of perspectives: the attempt to
categorize and describe neutrally existing systems of governance; the critique of
current systems; and the proposal of new systems of governance or
improvements in current systems. Weber’s own sense of Herrschaft has changed
over time, and is one of the foci of recent re-readers, as the section infra
indicates.) .
7 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 722. Trubek’s discussion of Weber remains the authoritative treatment
in the American legal academy of the Weberian understanding of the role of law
in development. I discovered Trubek’s work as a law student, and am indebted
to him for showing me that such topics had been and could be successfully
incorporated into one’s career as a lawyer and legal scholar. Most of the
citations that follow in this section refer to Trubek’s essay, but Trubek in turn
relied primarily on three sources: Max Rheinstein, Introduction, MAX WEBER ON
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954); REINHARD BENDIX, MAX
WEBER, AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 385-457 (1962); and Weber’s essay, “Sociology
of Law,” which appears in MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (G. Roth & R.
Wittich ed. 1968). The advantage of Trubek’s treatment is not only that it

11
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The starting point for this typology was the sense that
modern Western governance was characterized by a
commitment within its legal systems to the goal of “logically
formal rationality.”8 Per David Trubek’s fine summary:
“Legal thought is rational to the extent that it relies on some
justification that transcends the particular case, and is based
on existing, unambiguous rules; formal to the extent that the
criteria of decision are intrinsic to the legal system; and
logical to the extent that rules or principles are consciously
constructed by specialized modes of legal thought which rely
on … systematization, and to the extent that decisions of
specific cases are reached by processes of specialized
deductive logic proceeding from previously established
rules or principles.”9
Logically formal rationality in the law aided the
tendencies in European society towards capitalistic
economic growth in two primary ways. First, it weakened
the hold traditional ruling classes on the levers of power,
and as such allowed relatively autonomous groups –
critically, capitalists and workers – to emerge.10 Second, it
channeled the exercise of legal power into predictable
processes and results, thus enabling market actors to rely on
contract and property rights to structure their interactions
and to achieve greater efficiency therein.11
These concepts in Weber’s account, written in the
early twentieth century, of logically formal rationality and
synthesizes these disparate sources on Weber’s sociology of law, but also that it
re-orients them in a way readily accessible to a legal, as opposed to a
sociological, disciplinary perspective.
8

David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 730. As Trubek pointed out in that essay, the English common law
system constituted an important counterfactual example for Weber’s hypothesis.
See id.
10 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 744.
11 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 742-743.
9
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the rise of capitalism will seem eminently familiar to legal
scholars today: they have become touchstones in the field of
law and economics. Freedom from interference in legal
outcomes by “irrational” sources, whether they be such
status-based pressure (what some might describe as a
variant of “corruption”), or equitable considerations, has
been argued to be central to the ability of market actors to
operate efficiently. Predictability, flowing in part from this
freedom from interference but also from the commitment to
formal rationality, has also been argued to be crucial to
efficient market activity.
Thus, according to Weber, “[T]he rationalization and
systematization of the law in general and … the increasing
calculability of the functioning of the legal process in
particular, constituted one of the most important conditions
for the existence of … capitalistic enterprise, which cannot
do without legal security.”12
Logically formal rationality, as a central characteristic
of modern Western governance, could be contrasted against
modes of governance visible in other societies.
The
“traditional” mode based its authority on claims to
customary or familial status: an “established belief in the
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those
exercising authority under them.”13 The “charismatic”
mode, which based its authority on the claims of a particular
ruler to a special authority based on that ruler’s
extraordinary qualities,14 bears a family resemblance to the
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 883 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968). For a
more detailed working out of the relationship see David Trubek, Towards a Social
Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Politics in Economic Development,
YALE L.J.]
13 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
14 Weber defined charisma as “the quality of a personality, held to be out of the
ordinary (and originally thought to have magical sources, both in the case of the
prophets and men who are wise in healing or in law, the leaders of the hunt or
heroes in war), on account of which the person is evaluated as being gifted with
supernatural or superhuman or at least specifically out of the ordinary powers
12
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“cult of personality.” While every society had elements of
all three of these, one could nevertheless categorize societies
according to the primacy of one of these modes of
governance.
Theoretical Insight #2: Protestant Values and the Rise
of Capitalism
Weber’s essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism undoubtedly constitutes his most widely
influential concept, reaching beyond the academy to
everyday
conventional
wisdom.
Written
contemporaneously with a voyage to the United States,15
Weber sought to explain why, notwithstanding the general
characteristic of “rationalism” in the law amongst European
societies, capitalistic behavior had taken root more strongly
in some as opposed to others within this group. In
particular, Weber sought to explain the reasons why those
“districts of highest economic development” were at the
same time most amenable to Protestantism and “revolution
in the Church.”16
Weber rejected the explanation that “the greater
participation of Protestants in the positions of ownership
and management in modern economic life may… be
understood … simply as a result of the greater material
wealth they have inherited.”17 He also rejected as simplistic
not accessible to everybody, and hence as a ‘leader.’” MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 241 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
15 Part One, setting out “The Problem” of greater economic development in
Protestant societies and Luther’s idea of the calling, was published in 1904 just
before Weber’s trip to the United States. Part Two, elaborating on the “Practical
Ethics of the Ascetic Branches of Protestantism,” was published shortly after his
return. See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF
TRAGEDY 93 (1996); and Diggins more generally for an examination of Weber’s
views on America.
16 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 36 (Talcott
Parsons trans., 1930) [hereinafter WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC].
17 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.37.

14
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the notion that success in capitalism flowed from a
“secularization of all ideals through Protestantism.”18
Rather, Weber argued that the particular intensity of
capitalistic behavior among some – especially Calvinist –
denominations arose from an alliance of religious virtue, on
the one hand, with economic gain, on the other. Within this
worldview, economic gain was expressive of religious
virtue. As such, the pious individual was obligated by his
religious calling to maximize his material gain.
This conceptual shift constituted what Weber called a
“reversal” of the “natural relationship”:19 “A man does not
‘by nature’ wish to earn more and more money, but simply
to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is
necessary for that purpose.”20 The Protestant ethic of which
Weber wrote, however, contradicted this “traditional
manner of life” and “traditional rate of profit.”21 In holding
that “[e]conomic acquisition is no longer subordinated to
man as the means for the satisfaction of his material
needs,”22 this shift laid the foundation for instead a “new
spirit, the spirit of modern capitalism.”23
The Protestant ethic arose from a foundation of
“rationalism” which characterized more generally the trend
within European societies.24 This rationalism was filtered
through Martin Luther’s conception of the calling, in which
“the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs
[w]as the highest form which the moral activity of the
individual could assume:”25 that is, one’s religiousity
manifested itself in engagement with, rather than
“monastic” disassociation from, worldly activity.
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.40.
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.53.
20 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.60.
21 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.59.
22 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.53.
23 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.60.
24 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.79.
25 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.80.
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According to Weber, Luther’s conception of the calling
remained “traditionalistic”26: “The individual should remain
… in the station … in which God had placed him, and
should restrain his worldly activity within the limits
imposed by his established station in life.”27 The later
Calvinist, Baptist and Methodist denominations within
Protestantism would, however, press into new service the
notion of worldly activity as indicative of grace: worldly
activity now not only manifested one’ salvation, but actually
proved one’s worthiness of being saved.28
These
perspectives required the individual “methodically to
supervise his own state of grace in his own conduct, and
thus to penetrate it with asceticism.”29 The notion of
asceticism as a prerequisite to salvation required an intense
unification and “rationalization of conduct within this

WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.85.
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.85.
28 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.121, discussing the contribution by Calvinism
of the “idea of the necessity of proving one’s faith in worldly activity.” Primary
in the development of this approach, according to Weber, was the Calvinist idea
of predestination: although at first blush the idea that “some men and angels are
predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting
death,” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 100 (quoting the Westminster Confession of
1647), would appear to render moot any possible contributions through one’s
conduct to salvation or damnation, in fact the doctrine developed into two tenets
which would place worldly conduct at the center of salvation: “On the one hand,
it is held to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen, and to combat all
doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-confidence is the result of
insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace… On the other hand, in order to attain
that self-confidence intense worldly activity is recommended as the most
suitable means.” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 111-112. Although Baptism and
Methodism rejected the doctrine of predestination, Weber argued that they
reached the same endpoint by alternative means: in the case of Methodism, the
“aspiration to the higher life… served [] as a sort of makeshift for the doctrine of
predestination” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 142-143; in the case of Baptist
doctrine, the “immense importance … attributed by the … doctrine of salvation
to the role of the conscience as the revelation of God to the individual gave…
conduct in worldly callings … the greatest significance for the development of
the spirit of capitalism.” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, pp.150-151.
29 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 153.
26
27
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world… for the sake of the world beyond.”30
This drive to rationalize and unify one’s conduct
according to ascetic principles lent itself to, and meshed
with, the rationalistic emphases of capitalism on the
measurement of production for the maximization of gain.
Thus, “[t]hat powerful tendency toward uniformity of life,
which to-day so immensely aids the 31capitalistic interest of
the standardization of production, had its ideal foundations
in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh.”32
The “accumulation of capital” was aided not only by this
emphasis on uniform and disciplined conduct, but also at
least as importantly by the “ascetic compulsion to save” as a
form of abnegation of worldly enjoyment and therefore an
indication of grace.33 “Waste” was the “deadliest of sins.”
By contrast, “wealth” was harmful “only … as a temptation
to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life”: hence saving and
investment indicated both that virtuous industriousness had
generated profit, and that virtuous piety had led to the
refusal to enjoy that profit in the form of personal
consumption. Saving and investment became principal
indicatives of virtue, at the same time that they furthered
capitalistic ends.
Finally, “Protestant Asceticism” gave a particular
moralized underpinning to the emergence of waged
workforces employed capitalist entrepreneurs. To begin
with, according to Weber ascetic literature generally
condoned the “idea that faithful labour, even at low wages,
on the part of those whom life offers no other opportunities,
is highly pleasing to God” and ultimately “the only means of

WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 155.
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 157.
32 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 169.
33 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.172 (“The restraints which were imposed upon
the consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by making possible the
productive investment of capital.”)
30
31
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attaining certainty of grace.”34 In addition, Protestantism
“legalized the exploitation of this specific willingness to
work, in that it also interpreted the employer’s business
activity as a calling.”35 The pressure imposed by employers
upon workers to achieve increasing profits not only failed to
offend, but actually furthered, this particular conception of
virtue.
Thus, both with respect to the capitalistic labor force and
with respect to the capitalistic employer, Protestant
Asceticism provided a special motivation: “The emphasis on
the ascetic importance of a fixed calling provided an ethical
justification of the modern specialized division of labour. In
a similar way the providential interpretation of profitmaking justified the activities of the business man.”36
Surrounding the content of this analysis, Weber
established several caveats.
First, the integration of
Protestant Ascetism into capitalistic life was not anything
intended by its authors: “the cultural consequences of the
Reformation were to a great extent … unforeseen and even
unwished for results of the labours of the reformers. They
were often far removed from or even in contradiction to all
that they themselves thought to attain.”37
In a second caveat, Weber specifically discouraged an
interpretation of his work that privileged religious or
cultural values above other causal dynamics of societal
change: on the contrary, in view of the “interdependent
influences” of “material basis,” “forms of social and political
organization,” and “ideas,” it would be “foolish and
doctrinaire” to assert that “capitalism… could only have
arisen as a result of certain effects of the [Protestant]
Reformation.”38 Weber emphasized that is was “not [his]
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 178.
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.178.
36 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.163.
37 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.90.
38 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.91.
34
35
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aim” to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally
one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of… history.”39
The goal of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
was, rather, much more modestly to “as far as possible”
clarify “what concrete aspects of our capitalistic culture can
be traced to” religious movements, keeping in mind the
interdependence of material, social, political and ideational
“relationships.”40
As a final caveat, Weber argued that, although religious
asceticism had helped to give rise to the “spirit of modern
capitalism” through its emphasis on “rational conduct on the
basis of the calling,”41 the capitalistic system “no longer
need[ed] the support of any religious forces.”42 To the
contrary, “[s]ince ascetism undertook to remodel the world
and work out its ideals in the world, material goods have
gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over
the lives of men as at no previous period in history.”43
Weber’s view of societal end-point of this trajectory was
indeed somewhat gloomy: religious asceticism ultimately
gave rise to a dynamic that undermined its own importance
in the production of wealth, so that all that remained was the
latter. It was in the United States, which had inspired Weber
to write The Protestant Ethic, that he saw this dynamic most
clearly: “In the field of its highest development, in the
United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious
and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely
mundane passions, which often actually give it the character
of sport.”44
This last point is perhaps most surprising from the point
of view of the popular reception of Weberian thought. The
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.183.
WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.91.
41 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.181.
42 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.72.
43 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.181.
44 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.182.
39
40
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Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism did not set out to
celebrate either modernism or capitalism. Indeed, Weber
ended his study on a decisively somber note:
No one knows … whether at the end of this tremendous
development… there will be a great rebirth of old ideas
and ideals, or… mechanized petrification embellished
with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last
stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly
said: ‘Specialists without spirit, sensualists without
heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of
civilization never before achieved.’45

Theoretical Insight #3: The “Iron Cage” of Bureaucracy
The “tragic vision of history”46 suggested by Weber’s
gloomy assessment of modern capitalism at the end of The
Protestant Ethic is perhaps most expressly elaborated in
Weber’s writings on the bureaucratization of modern
government.
Perhaps because Weber’s writings on
bureaucracy remain somewhat less familiar than his “ideal
types” and “protestant ethic” insights, they appear to form
his most intricate of observations (this set of insights also
seems to prefigure many of the arguments of critical
theorists writing later in the twentieth century).47 This
45

WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.182.

46 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 10

(1996) (attributing to Weber a “vision of history, religion, society and politics”
that “contains several dimensions of tragedy.”) Diggins links this tragic
sensibility with Weber’s appreciation for the writings of Nietzsche and Simmel,
within German philosophy, and also in Weber’s knowledge of the “themes of
Attic tragedy.” See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT
OF TRAGEDY 10 (1996). Weber’s description also resembles in some ways
Durkheim’s rendition of anomie in modern life. See Durkheim.
47 See, e.g., NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004) (alluding to how
the Frankfurt School employed “Weber’s (and Freud’s and Nietzsche’s) cultural
pessimism about an administered world to criticize American mass culture.”);
NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION VERSUS
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theoretical intricacy and relative unfamiliarity means that
somewhat more attention will be given here to describing
this particular theoretical insight.
Bureaucracy, Rationalization and Disenchantment
In Economy and Society, Weber identified bureaucratic
government – “general rules, hierarchy, full-time training,
and so on”48 – as a central feature of the process of societal
rationalization:49
From a purely technical point of view, a bureaucracy is
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and
is in this sense formally the most rational known means
of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior
to any other form in precision, in stability, in the
stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus
makes possible a particularly high degree of
calculability of results for the heads of the organization
and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior
both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its

RE-ENCHANTMENT 81-150 (2002) (demonstrating, inter alia, analytical similarities
between Weber’s writings on rationalization and re-enchantment, and those of
Foucault, Baudrillard and Lyotard); Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of
Logically Formal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1076 (2004)
(“To a degree that has continually surprised me, … Weber’s sociology of law, in
conjunction with his general sociology of disenchantment, seems to lead to the
conclusion that much critical legal studies work, in the skeptical vein, has been
reinvention, or adaptation to view non-Weberian purposes, of Weberian
wheels.”).
48 Jon Elster, Rationality, Economy and Society, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER
21, 22 (2000).
49 "This whole process of rationalization in the factory and elsewhere, and
especially in the bureaucratic state machine, parallels the centralization of the
material implements of organization in the hands of the master. Thus, discipline
inexorably takes over ever larger areas as the satisfaction of political and
economic needs is increasingly rationalized." Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER
ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 156 (1968) (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein
trans., 1968).
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operations and is formally capable of application to all
kinds of administrative tasks.50

Bureaucratization not only grew out of the rationalization
process, but constituted the only realistic way of
administering the complex societal forms that accompany
it.51 Because “logically formal rationality” in society also
accompanies the emergence of capitalism, it follows that
bureaucratic administration is ultimately necessary for the
preservation of the formally-rational legal system that allows
capitalism to thrive.52 Indeed, bureaucratization in
governance was none other than an application of the same
principles of rationality and technological progress that
produced industrialization.53 Bureaucratic rationality also
represents the triumph of “instrumental rationality” 54 over

Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 223 (1968)
(Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1968).
51 "The needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable.
The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of
administration." Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 224 (1968) (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1968).
50

Cf. "To this extent increasing bureaucratization is a function of the increasing
possession of goods used for consumption, and of an increasingly sophisticated
technique for fashioning external life--a technique which corresponds to the
opportunities provided by such wealth" p.212, Weber, Max. 1946/1958. From
Max Weber. Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills.
52

53 "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always
been its purely technical superiortiy over any other kind of organization. The
fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations
exactly as does the machine with the nonmechanical modes of organization"
p.214, Weber, Max. 1946/1958. From Max Weber. Translated and edited by H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills.

Jon Elster, Rationality, Economy and Society, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
WEBER, at 21, 23 (2000) (“the substantive rationality of legal and bureaucratic
institutions [in Weber’s thought’ is a form of instrumental adaptation. Whereas
individual value-rational action is oriented towards a specific behavior without
regard for its consequences…, substantively rational action is guided by its
consequences.”)
54
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“value rationality,” the latter being Weber’s term for
““conscious belief as a value for its own sake.”55
Bureaucratic governance, “guided by instrumental
reason,” therefore “lies in stark contrast to non-modern
forms” of governance – traditional and charismatic – which
confer validity on value-rational grounds.56 As a triumph of
instrumental rationality, bureaucratization represented
modern capitalism’s vanquishing of the Protestant Ethic.
Whereas Protestant Asceticism at one time provided a
justification of certain kinds of rationalistic, maximizing
behaviors as ends in themselves, modern capitalism
supplanted these justifications with those that valued such
behaviors for the maximizations they produced.57

55 Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 24-25 (1968)
(Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1968). As Weber explained in Economy
and Society, social behavior could be explained in four possible ways: (1)
“instrumentally rational,” or consequentialist, grounds; (2) “value-rational”
grounds; (3) “effectual” grounds, or “specific affects and feeling states”; or (4)
“traditional” grounds, that is, “ingrained habituation.” Id.
56 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY 25 (2002) (discussing
“rationalization and disenchantment” in Weberian theory). “Both of these types
of domination are personal rather than impersonal forms of rule, and neither is
grounded upon a system of rational law. On the one hand, traditional
authority… proceeds ‘by virtue of age-old rules and powers’ …. On the other,
charismatic authority, while based on personal devotion to the leader or hero
(prophet), is foreign to rules and proceeds through the repudiation of past
authority…. [Both] traditional and charismatic authority .. are orders of authority
which demand unlimited personal obligation… [With rationalization] both tend
to be replaced by the impersonal rule of the modern (capitalist) bureaucratic
state.” Gane, at pp.25-26. See also "The appartus (bureaucracy), with its
peculiar impersonal character. . . is easily made to work for anybody who knows
how to gain control over it. A rationally ordered system of officials continues to
function smoothly after the enemy has occupied the area: he merely needs to
change the top officials" p.229, Weber, Max. 1946/1958. From Max Weber.
Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Galaxy.
57 See, e.g., JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF
TRAGEDY 26 (1996) (describing Weber’s theory of capitalism as a “sociological
phenomenon springing up originally from religious convictions, which would
eventually give way to secularization as the entrepreneur continued to
demonstrate his qualifications as a Christian by his business integrity.”).
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This was one of the paradoxes that Weber
underscored: the way in which the very religious values that
helped to propel modern activity in the form of industry in
the economic sphere, scientific inquiry, and even the rule of
law ultimately created institutions that would destabilize the
values that birthed them. In “depicting this movement from
God … to the disenchantment of religious forms,” Weber
“adheres to a Nietzschean thesis: the highest values devalue
themselves.”58
This devaluation of values was what Weber called
the “disenchantment” of modern society. In his discussion
of “Modernization as Societal Rationalization,” Jurgen
Habermas quotes a passage of Weber’s from a littletranslated essay entitled “Zwischenbetrachtung” or
“Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions”:
The rational knowledge to which ethical religiosity had
itself appealed followed its own autonomous and
innerworldly norms. It fashioned a cosmos of truths
which no longer had anything to do with the systematic
postulates of a rational religious ethic… On the contrary,
rational knowledge had to reject this claim in
principle…although the science that created this cosmos
seemed unable to answer with certainty the question of
its own ultimate presuppositions.59

Much as with his analysis of the Protestant Ethic,
Weber’s theorizing of bureaucracy hardly celebrated
NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION
(quoting p.9, Nietzsche, The Will to Power, W.
Kaufman trans. (1978)).
58

VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 21 (2002)

P.229, Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol.1: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society (1984) (Thomas MacCarthy trans.) Thus, Weber
showed how disenchantment was hydraulically related to modern processes of
analysis with more dynamic methodology than Durkheim’s anomie, which
identified a similar malaise in modernity, but attributed it to the preeminence of
individualism over group identity, rather than to the very means of reasoning
within modernity.
59
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modernity. Rather, Weber literally despaired the rise
of bureaucratization. In his remarks to a 1901
academic conference in Vienna, Weber exclaimed,
“The passion for bureaucracy…is enough to drive one
to despair.… but what can we oppose to this
machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free
from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme
mastery of the bureaucratic way of life… I only wish
to challenge the unquestioning idolization of
bureaucracy.”60
Disenchantment resulting from
bureaucratization thus constituted one of the “baleful
consequences” arising from the “noblest impulses” of
modernity.61

Bureaucracy, Irrationality and “Anti-Formalism”
The “baleful consequences” of rationalization and
bureaucratization extended beyond the disenchantment of
modern life. Indeed, in a turn of analysis reflected by later
critical theory, Weber showed how the terrain of a
rationalized governance ultimately became susceptible to a
peculiarly modern form of irrationality.
This irrationality flows from the very dynamic that
generated rationalization, namely the “devaluation of
ultimate values.”62 In addition to producing the rationalized
world of “stable calculations,” rationalization allows for the
“emergence of a polytheistic and disordered world of
competing values and ideals. For with the rise of modern
60 Remarks, Vienna 1901, Verein für Sozialpolitik, cited in Alan Sica,
Rationalization and Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 42, 53 (2000).
61 Benjamin Nelson, Discussion on Industrialization and Capitalism, in Stammer
ed., Max Weber and Sociology, pp.17-168; cited in Alan Sica, Rationalization and
Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 42, 54 (quoted above note 2).
62 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 29 (2002).
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scientific (or ‘rational’) knowledge, religion is, for the first
time, challenged by the disparate claims of other life-orders
(Lebensordnungen), the economic, political, aesthetic, erotic
and intellectual, which, with the onset of modernity,
separate out into relatively autonomous realms.”63 Scientific
rationality has both displaced prior ultimate means of
assessing values, and failed by its own terms to provide a
replacement: the result is that competing non-scientific value
systems persist at the same time that they are unable to
establish supremacy according to the overarching scientific
logic. “The transition to modernity is thus a paradoxical
one, for it brings new ‘rational’ means for controlling and
systematizing life while at the same time inaugurating an
endless struggle between (and within) opposing valuespheres.”64
This paradoxical tendency towards irrationality
surfaces even within the modern legal system, premised on
“logically formal rationality.” Within the legal system, the
proliferation of values resurfaces as the “rise of policy
analysis.”65 The devaluation of values destroys the
“immanent” quality of law – that is, natural law becomes
replaced by positive law.66 Habermas summarizes the turn
to policy: “From the perspective of a formal ethic based on
63

NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION

VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 29 (2002).

NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION
35 (2002).
65 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max
Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1071 (2004).
66 “The disappearance of the old natural law conceptions has destroyed all
possibility of providing the law with a metaphysical dignity by virtue of its
immanent qualities.” MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 874-875 (G. Roth & R.
Wittich ed. 1968); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically
Formal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1066 (2004)
(“Positivism becomes the theory of lawmaking because natural law is
implausible in theory.”)
64

VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT
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general principles, legal norms … now count as mere
conventions that can be considered hypothetically and
enacted positively.”67
On the one hand, the demise of “immanent”
constraints on lawmaking increased the authority of
lawmakers to act as arbiters between “mere” norms. On the
other, the modern system expressly turned to lawmakers as
the positivist authority for resolving such conflicts. Hence
lawmakers, in Weber’s understanding of “politics as a
vocation,” are torn between the “ethics of conviction,” in
which action was justified on “value-rational” grounds or
“immanent norms,” and the “ethics of responsibility,” in
which lawmakers consider the outcomes of their decisions
on an instrumentally rational basis that must take into
account political “responsibility for the predictable
consequences of the action….”68 This tension is exacerbated,
Kennedy writes, by the “dynamism of the capitalist
economy [which] generate[s], constantly, increasingly, legal
gaps or conflicts involving large economic and political
stakes.”69
The result is that the peculiar tendency of irrationality
in modern society is reflected in the “anti-formal tendencies
of modern law.”70 Of modern law, Weber concludes: “In the
great majority of its most important provisions, it has been

pp.162-163, Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action vol.1 (1984).
P.16, Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. & trans. E.A.
Shils & H.A. Finch (1949); see also NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN
THEORY: RATIONALIZATION VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 64-69 (2002).
69 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max
Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1067 (2004).
70 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max
Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1064 (2004).
67
68
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unmasked all too visibly, as the product of the technical
means of a compromise between conflicting interests.” 71

Bureaucracy, Democracy and Power
Weber’s conceptualization of conflicting interests in
modern life understood politics as a struggle for power.72 In
opposition to the Marxian view of modern power politics as
essentially class-based, Weber argued that power could be
measured and distributed according to class, status or
party.73 Although such struggle could take multiple shapes,
Weber nevertheless insisted on an analytical lens that
acknowledged the “violence of this struggle and the violence
of political power.”74 Indeed, Weber defined the state as
“that human community which (successfully) lays claim to
the monopoly of legitimate physical violence.”75
This perspective demonstrates the influence on
Weber’s theory of Nietzsche’s writings, not only in the
analysis of disenchantment as the “devaluation of values”76
71 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 875 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968); see
also Gane at pp.40-41; Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary
Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1066 (2004).
72 “The essence of politics is struggle.” MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1415,
1450 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968).
73 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. & ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright
Mills.
74 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 74 (2002).
75 Peter Lansmann, Power, Politics and Legitimation, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
WEBER 83, 90 (2000).
76 p.101, Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the cultural situation of the modern age,
p.99: The coda in Weber on ‘specialists without spirit’is Weber’s version of those
‘last men who invented happiness’ pilloried in Nietzsche’s prologue to
Zarathustra. See Nietzche, at p.10: (“I will speak of the mot contemptible thing;
that… is the last man!... ‘What is love? What is creation? What is a star?’ So asketh
the last man and blinketh. The earth hath then become small, and on it there
hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small…`We have discovered
happiness,’ say the last men and blink….” Thus Spake Zarathustra, Friedrich
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but also in the analysis of governance as power struggle.77
Thus, Weber stated in Economy and Society that “without
exception every sphere of social action is profoundly
influenced by structures of dominancy.” 78
Weber declared: “there can … be no real work in
political economy on the basis of optimistic dreams of
happiness. Abandon all hope ye who enter here: these
words are inscribed above the portals of the unknown future
history of mankind.”79
The political struggle that Weber analyzed in modern
society was subject to two competing dynamics:
bureaucratization, on the one hand, and democratization, on
the other.
Bureaucratization reproduced a form of social
oligarchy. Due to the large scale of organizational
complexity required to govern in modern bureaucracies,
power tended to consolidate in hierarchical form favoring
technocratic elites.80 At the same time, the “leveling of
distinctions” based on traditional status in modern society
produced a dynamic of democratization.81
These two dynamics could produce tendencies in two
possible directions: “either ‘administering’ the mass of
Nietzsche, trans. Thomas Common, 1997.
77 KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER 7-8 (1998).
78 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 941 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968).
79 Weber, “The National State and Economic Policy” (Inaugural Lecture,
Freiburg, May 1895), trans. B. Fowkes, in Reading Weber, ed. K. Tribe (1989)
(quoted in NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY:
RATIONALIZATION VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 166 n.13 (2002)).
80 This observation of Weber’s was subsequently developed by his fellow
sociologist Robert Michels as an “iron law of oligarchy” in modern societies.
Michels, Robert. 1915. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Translated by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul.
81 Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the Cultural Situation of the Modern Age, in
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 101, 106 (2000).
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citizens deprived of rights and freedoms like a herd of cattle
in a bureaucratic `authoritarian state’ with pseudoparliamentarianim, or else including the citizens as
participants in the state.”82
Both types of governance – “pseudo-democracy” and
“participatory democracy” – were entirely possible
outcomes of the modern rationalization process. Indeed,
between the two, Weber appeared to believe the former to be
the more likely outcome. The threat to democratic
governance from modern rationalization stemmed not only
from its tendency towards bureaucratic hierarchy, but also
from the cultural acclimation of citizens to their role as “little
cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving toward
bigger ones” within the “machinery” of modern
bureaucratic capitalism:83
That the world should know no men but these: it is in
such an evolution that we are already caught up, and
the great question is, therefore, not how we can promote
and hasten it, but what can we oppose to this machinery
in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this
parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of
the bureaucratic way of life.84

In other words, concerted effort was required to maintain
even the viability of democratic government in the modern
state. Weber clearly viewed modern bureaucratization as
both inevitable and in many ways distasteful. Weber also
saw democracy as under threat from the modernity’s more
central feature, bureaucratic rationalization in government.
Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the Cultural Situation of the Modern Age, in
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 101, 106 (2000). [quoting Weber’s Zur Politik
im Weltkrieg: Schriften und Redden 1914-1918, or “On Policy during the World
War: Writings and Speeches 1914-1918]
83 Weber quoted by J.P. Mayer in Max Weber and German Politics, 2nd. edition.
London, Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 126-127.
84 Weber quoted by J.P. Mayer in Max Weber and German Politics, 2nd. edition.
London, Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 126-127.
82
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Weber saw this dynamic most clearly in his own country,
where the post-Bismarckian state appeared to have choked
off real democratic participation.85
From the foregoing characterizations, one might infer
Weber’s allegiance to a contractarian set of ideals regarding
the normative foundation for democratic governance and
the rule of law, and a commitment to the normative
egalitarianism found in social contract theorists of the
modern state such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Such an inference would be mistaken, however. Weber does
not appear to have shared the focus of these Enlightenment
theorists on the normative necessity of universal political
liberalism. Sven Eliasson has written that
[Weber] was a liberal in the sense of being deeply concerned
about the individual as an autonomous cultural being …. But he
did not defend this as an ordinary principle… [and] [i]ndeed he
did not think that this was feasible for ordinary people,
governed by the necessity of making a living… This was an
aristocratic notion of autonomy rather than a principled
universalistic one.86

This indifference of Weber’s to Enlightenment ideals,87 and
their foundations in the political philosophies of classical
85 Sven Eliaeson, Constitutional Ceasarism: Weber’s Politics in their German Context,
in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 131, 136 (2000): Weber very much was
responding to the political context of German: the danger of domination by the
feudalistic Junker class, who were “anti-modernist and backward-looking” and
dependent on economic protectionism by the state; the weakness of the
bourgeoisie, coupled with their “antipolitical” tendencies (“in part to a long
tradition of Romantic skepticism about the Enlightenment, and in part to a sense
of impotence resulting from the failure of the liberals to unify Germany in 1848”)
so that Weber expressed worry about whether “the German bourgeoisie has the
maturity … to be the leading political class”; and dislike of the working class and
its journalist leaders who were “poseurs.”
86 Eliasson, supra, at 137.
87 Peter Lansmann, Power, Politics and Legitimation, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
WEBER 83, 88 (2000) (describing the lack of influence of Locke and Rousseau on
Weber).

31

RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

antiquity,88 manifested itself, secondly, in a sharply
circumscribed understanding even of “real,” participatory
democracy.
Weber asserted that “[t]rue democracy means...
submission to a leader whom the people have elected
themselves.”89 Thus, the choice between “participatory
democracy” and “pseudo-parliamentary democracy”
appeared to boil down to the difference between “a
leadership democracy with a ‘machine’” and “a democracy
without a leader, which means rule by the ‘professional
politicians.’”90 Thus, Weber played an important role in
ensuring that the Weimar constitution allowed the president
to be elected directly by the people rather than parliament,91
but at the same time held a very limited view of the people’s
ability to hold the president accountable at any but the most
general level.92
88 Lansmann, supra, at 91 (describing Weber’s rejection of Aristotelian
classifications of government in favor of his own “command”-based typology).
89 KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER 171 (1998) (quoting Beetham, Max Weber and the
Theory of Modern Politics, p.236).
90 P.142:, citing Landesmann & Ronald Spiers ed., Political Writings (1994), at
351. This quote resembles that from Eliasson p.106 cited above.
91 Article 41 of the Weimar Constitution.
92 Hence the following recorded exchange between the reactionary General
Ludendorff and Weber: “Ludendorff: What is your idea of a democracy, then?
Weber: In a democracy the people choose a leader whom they trust. Then the
chosen man says, “Now shut your mouths and obey me. The people and the
parties are no longer free to interfere in the leader’s business.” The exchange
between Weber and Lufendorff, according to Eliasson, came at the end of the
World War I when Weber was trying to convince Lufendorff to “give himself up
to the Allies.” Id. At 146. After the quoted passage above, “Weber added that
thereafter the people can rule and say ‘to the gallows with the leader.’” Id. At
147. Nevertheless, Weber’s endorsement of “leadership democracy” generated
strong criticism after World War II, particularly in Wolfgang Mommsen’s charge
that Weber’s theory served “to make the German people inwardly willing to
acclaim Adolf Hitler’s leadership position.” Id. At 144 (quoting Mommsen, Max
Weber and German Politics (1959) at 410). Although Weber died in 1920, his
express opposition during his lifetime to anti-Semitism and to racism, as well as
his defense of academic freedom, suggests that he would have opposed Nazism.
See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 271
(1996). Nevertheless, Weber undoubtedly left some ambiguity as to the
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Thus, Weber’s understanding of democracy stemmed
from a pragmatic, rather than a normative, orientation.
Weber saw democracy – at the aforementioned
“plebiscitary” level as necessary to break the chokehold of
the landholding interests who were stalling Germany’s
capitalist economic growth. Democracy, Weber, believed,
could help to mobilize Germany’s relatively weak
bourgeoisie.93 In this sense, democracy in Germany’s
particular context could help to propel capitalism. The
converse relationship – that capitalism would automatically
give rise to democracy – was not a Weberian hypothesis.
Moreover, the relationship between democracy and
economic growth that Weber desired would not naturally
arise but rather had to be pursued through concerted reform.
relationship between popular accountability and “leadership democracy.”
For example, in addition to Article 41 enabling direct presidential
elections, Weber also supported Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, which
“granted the president extraordinary powers in times of crisis,” although
Weber’s role in relation to Article 48 is a matter of dispute while his role in
promoting Article 41 is accepted knowledge.” Sven Eliasson, Constitutional
Caesarism, at p.142. Though Weber himself did not expressly resolve the
ambiguous relationship between popular election and extraordinary presidential
power, one “author who devoted much of his thought to resolving the
constitutional ambiguities that Weber bequeathed to German posterity was Carl
Schmitt.” Id. At. 147. Schmitt foresaw that “Weimar parliamentarianism could
not withstand” the a “totalizing party” such as the National Socialists. “The
presidential leader, Hindenburg, came to a parallel conclusion, and used Article
48 to install Hitler in power. Schmitt, in short, filled the lacunae in Weber’s
constitutional thinking. How Weber himself might have filled it will,” according
to Eliasson, “forever remain unclear.” Id. At 147. For a thorough exposition and
critique of Schmitt’s constitutional thought, see Oren Gross, The Normless and
Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the “NormException” Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1824 (1999-2000).
One final clue perhaps lies in Weber’s somewhat surprising support for
a “strong parliament” as a corrective “to balance the power of the bureaucracy.”
Id. At p.142. Weber appears, therefore and contrary to his own dichotomous
phrasing, to have supported both “parliamentarian democracy and plebiscitary
rule.” Id. At 143. The best explanation for this, according to Eliasson, is that
Weber “envisioned balance, much like in a monarchical system.” Id. At 143.
93 See Chapter 2 in KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER (1998).
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PART II. A Geneaology of Theory, Policy and Praxis:
Weber and Development Theorists
There are three key moves that get made in the
transition from Weber’s own insights to the truths of
development policy. The first two, relatively explicit, moves
are: (1) the move from an inductively based set of ideal types
of society to an a priori belief in a single evolutionary path for
all societies, ending in Western-style capitalist democracy;
(2) the move from identifying the importance of the
normative dimension of economic practices to a belief in the
primacy of “values” in economic practices.
The third move is more subtle, and indeed consists
mostly of analytical evasion rather than assertion. This is the
idea that democratic governance goes hand-in-hand with
capitalistic economic growth – more simplistically put, the
notion that markets and democracies are mutually
reinforcing components of the same evolutionary process.
In fact, all three of these moves were reflected in
significant elisions by Parsons of Weber’s own theoretical
premises. These elisions (which I will call “the Three
Theoretical Shortcuts”) can be summarized as follows: (1)
First, Weber himself repeatedly sought to resist the
temptation to induce a rigid, universalistic framework,
preferring to understand his typology as primarily heuristic;
however, Parsons employed Weberian theory to establish a
universal model of societal evolution (the “One-Size-FitsAll” Theoretical Shortcut). (2) Second, far from rejecting the
“materialist” analysis of Marx and others, Weber insisted on
the additionally important role of ideational frameworks
and saw the interaction between these two as explanatorily
essential; however, Parsons saw values as essentially
dispositive of social identity and social change (the
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“Determinism of Values” Theoretical Shortcut). (3) Weber’s
own his understanding was that democratic governance was
both necessary and significantly limited in its emancipatory
potential by the power dynamics inherent in
bureaucratization;
Parsons,
however,
assumed
an
unproblematic
correlaton
beween
institutional
rationalization in modernity, on the one, and democracy, on
the other (the “Correlation of Modernity with Democracy”
Theoretical Shortcut).
This geneaology follows the role of Weber in
Parsonian theory, with its accompanying Theoretical
Shortcuts, through to policy on law and development in
particular. At key moments, a symbiotic relationship arose
between leading scholars of modernization and
policymakers within the foreign affairs related branches of
the U.S. government. At those moments, ideas developed
within the academy took root and helped provide a basis for
U.S. policy. It is those moments within the academy, and
their transmittal to U.S. policy, that this section focuses on.
Through some interaction of these dynamics, all of
these thinkers display the same tendencies in reading Weber:
an attraction to a universal model of growth and
development, an emphasis on normative rather than nonnormative interests and an alliance of the normative with the
“expanding capitalist nucleus” idea, and a glossing-over of
the role of democracy.
This section will trace this geneaology. The first part
of this section will trace the three “elisions” of Weberian
theory -- the emphasis on normative over non-normative
factors, the emphasis on universals, and the superficial
association of market growth with democratic governance –
from Parsons into modernization theory. The section will
also highlight the intersections between economic and
sociological theory on the one hand, and development policy
discourse in the context of U.S. governmental practice on the
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other.
A. Talcott Parsons: “Structural Functionalism” as a
Precursor to Modernization Theory
Talcott Parsons is widely understood to have been the
most influential United States sociologist of the twentieth
century.94 Parsons was also an influential advocate for
Weberian theory in the U.S. scene, translating both The
Protestant Ethic and Economy and Society into English.95
Parsons’s advocacy included his inspirations by Weber in
formulating his distinctive brand of sociological theory,
which ultimately became known as “structuralfunctionalist” theory.96 Finally, Parsons also sought to
connect some of his theoretical conclusions to U.S. foreign
policy, playing an active advisory role from the 1930s to the
1950s as the U.S. developed its approach towards newly
decolonizing states.
The result of these combining factors was Parsonian
influence in the ensuring the importance of Weberian
thought in development theory, policy and praxis in the
mid-to-late twentieth-century United States – and also in
ensuring the reception of Weberian thought in a particular
form. The next sections will seek to demonstrate how the
three theoretical influences described above arose in
Parsons’ own theory, and how they replicated themselves
throughout the development discourse of this era.
94 PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 13 (1983). “Looking at the development of
American sociology over the past fifty years, one is immediately struck by the
scale of the contribution Talcott Parsons made… Parsons reformulated the
nature of sociological inquiry… and … gave it … a theoretical programme, which
it lacked before.”
95
96 Though structural-functionalism had fallen from grace by the 1970s, at its peak
the approach enjoyed status widespread influence within sociological theory.
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A.1. Parsons and Theoretical Shortcut #1 (“One-Size-FitsAll”): From “Ideal Types” to “Evolutionary Universals”
Parsons is often credited as being concerned above all
with building a “general” theory of social action as a
foundation for sociological analysis. Parsons’ first step
towards this end occurred in his work The Structure of Social
Action. The first step in Parsons’ own universalist analysis,
however, was an extrapolation of “generalized”97 and
“systematic” theoretical precepts from Weber’s analysis of
“ideal types.” Parsons was careful to establish that Weber
himself shied away from “systematic” analysis, ensuring
that the systematization of Weber’s analysis was identifiable
as Parsons’ unique improvement.
Before setting forth a systematic theory, Parsons
devoted some time to delineating the lack of systematic
analysis in Weber,98 much of which was intentional on
Weber’s part. Parsons observed Weber’s opposition to the
idealistic or intuitionist strain of German theory.99 By
contrast, Weber sought to embrace an inductive, and
ultimately empirical, approach.100 Parsons gives a careful
account of Weber’s balancing of the commitment to
identifying general principles with the awareness of the
limitations of those principles:
A general ideal type is such a construction of a
hypothetical course of events with two other
characteristics: (1) abstract generality and (2) the idealtypical exaggeration of empirical reality. Without the
first of these last two elements, the concept might be
Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.601; id. At p.640.
See Parsons, Structure of Social action, at pp.601-641.
99 Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.602.
100 Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.602 (“Weber throughout emphasized
that scientific concepts do not exhaust concrete reality but involve selection and
are hence in this sense unreal.”).
97
98
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applicable only to a single historical situation; without
the second it might be merely a common trait or a
statistical average.101

Although Weber’s analysis of ideal types seemed to embody
universalizable implications, Weber himself stopped short of
making those explicit. It was left to Parsons to clarify the
relationship of the “universal to the particular” in Weber’s
analysis.102 In doing so, Parsons declared it “necessary, in
order to clarify the implications of his position, to go beyond
Weber’s own analysis.”103
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons sought to
build a more “systematic classification of ideal types.”104 In
doing so, Parsons introduced his own “generalized
theoretical account” of society under a “structural” analysis
of “systems of action” and “systems of elements.”105 Indeed,
Parsons’ desire to construct a “total, general theoretical
system”106 would irritate many of his contemporaries.107 The
irritation may have become further inflamed by Parsons’
own rather abstruse language,108 requiring several iterations
Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.605-606.
Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.614.
103 Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.614.
104 Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.640.
105 Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.640.
106 “Parsons has stood virtually alone in his concern with the construction of a
total, general theoretical system.” Edward C. Devereux, Jr., Parsons’ Sociological
Theory, in THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1,
1 (1961).
107 “In his Dedication of The Social System, Talcott Parsons describes himself as an
incurable theorist. On this point even his severest critics would hasten to agree.
Certainly he has done a great deal more theorizing than any other contemporary
American sociologist; and it is probably also true that he has done rather less of
anything else.” See Devereux, supra, at 1. The philosopher Max Black derided
Parsons’ theories as tending towards “aphorisms” such as “Whenever you do
anything, you’re trying to get something done.” See Devereux, supra, at 279
(quoting Max Black, Some Questions About Parsons’ Theories, p.268.).
108 “Parsons has been explaining his own theories in his own words these many
years, but the evidence is rather impressive that he has not always succeeded in
making himself understood.” See Devereux, supra, at 1-2.
101
102

38

RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

both by the author himself109 and by commentators to gel
into the influential “structural-functional” sociological
theory of social action.
Methodologically, Parsons’ “structural-functionalist”
theory straddled German and Anglo-Saxon theory,110
seeking to blend the sought to blend the “analytical
elegance” and dynamism of economics, with both the
concreteness of positivists and the sensitivity to culture of
idealists.111 Thus, Parsons sought a transhistorical, general
“analytical theory”112 of society that was both dynamic and
See Chandler Morse, The Functional Imperatives, THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF
TALCOTT PARSONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 100, 113 (1961). “The relation of
structure to process was far from clear in early versions of the Parsonian model.
But as the model evolved, the relationship acquired an increasingly definite
form.” Id.
110 See Devereux, supra, at 2,4,5.
111 Parsons goal was to combine: Combine the “analytical elegance” and the
“action frame of reference” of economists (while rejecting their focus on
rationality), the focus on “physiological parameters of personality and human
behavior” of the positivists, while rejecting its elements of “mechanistic
determination,” and from the idealists the “analysis of cultural configurations
and of the role of ideas, values, and norms” without the “cultural relativism
which… blocked general theory.” See Devereux, supra, at 19.
112 Feraro explains the Parsonian understanding of the term: “The structural type
of [conceptual] scheme specifies concepts that refer to the types of units or parts
and the relations among them that constitute the generic structure of a category
of empirical system within the scope of a theoretical framework. The
corresponding general propositions are statements of uniformities in the
behavior of concrete parts and relations, as these are conceptualized. Parsons
calls such general propositions empirical generalizations. The analytical type of
[conceptual] scheme specifies analytical elements or variables, the values of
which characterize concrete components of the empirical system. The
corresponding general propositions are statements of uniformities in the
analytical relationships among such elements. Parsons calls them analytical laws.
An analytical theory, finally, is a system of analytical laws. One important
implication of these distinctions is that the formulation of an analytical theory
must be based upon an accompanying structural type of conceptual scheme as
well as an analytical type. The reason for this
is that an analytical law presupposes elements that characterize the various
components or concrete entities comprising an empirical system and these
components have to be conceptualized in structural terms (i. e., in terms of ideas
about the types of concrete units and their relations). It is because of this
methodological implication that Parsons exerts so much effort in his early work
109
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responsive to culture.
Within this structural account, Parsons emphasized
the importance of methodological dynamism, as expressed
on two different levels: first, the fundamental unit of
analysis was the “unit act,”113 and the sociological theory
itself was a theory of social action.114 Second, Parsons
embraced a “voluntaristic theory of action,” which assumed
a critical role of agency in determining how individuals
committed “unit acts” against the complex backdrop of his
structural-functional analytical framework.115
Parsons posited that social action occurred against a
backdrop of structural, universal features of the social
system.116 The three fundamental structural sub-systems
were:
“the personality systems of … individualized
117
actors”;
the differentiation and organization of social
to provide a general conception of the structure of empirical social action
systems that can become the basis for a later analytical sociological theory of
these systems.” THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS : FOUNDATION AND
SYNTHESIS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 82 (2001).
113 THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS : FOUNDATION AND SYNTHESIS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 88-93 (2001). The “unit act” was defined to include the
following elements: an actor; an “end” (that is, “a future state of affairs toward
which the process ofaction is oriented,”; a “situation,” “differing from that to
which action is oriented (the end) and including two elements, those which
cannot be altered by the actor – conditions – and those which he can control –
means); and a “specific mode of relationship between the elements of the unit
act, so that ‘in the choice of alterative means to the end insofar as the situation
allows alternatives, here is a ‘normative orientation’ of action.’” PETER
HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 70 (1983) (quoting Talcott Parsons, Structure of
Social Action at p.44).
114 E.g., Parsons’ landmark work, The Structure of Social Action (1937); Parsons,
Working Papers in the Theory of Action (1953).
115 See Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (1937); Parsons, The Social System
(1951).
THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS : FOUNDATION AND SYNTHESIS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 87 (2001).
116 “Structure, as Parsons sees it, represents at best a convenient way of codifying
and talking about certain apparent consistencies in social phenomena… [but in
order to avoid reification we must employ the] conception of dynamic
equilibrium.” See Devereux, supra, at 53.
117 “the personality systems of … individualized actors, consisting of internalized
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role;118 and “the culture system.”119 Of these three
interdependent sub-systems, Parsons saw culture as the
most dispositive.120
In The Social System (1951) and Toward a General Theory
of Action (1951), Parsons developed the “functionalist” side
of his methodology. In addition to taking place against this
structural backdrop, he now asserted, social action was
directed by a set of four “functional imperatives,” or
‘problems’ which must be met adequately if equilibrium
and/or continuing existence of the system is to be
maintained.”121
The four problems are those of Goal Attainment, or
“keeping the action system moving steadily toward its
goals”; Adaptation, or “properly perceiving and rationally
manipulating the object world for the attainment of ends”;
Integration, or “holding cooperating units in line, of creating
and maintaining ‘solidarity,’ despite the emotional strains
involved in the process of goal attainment”; and Latency, or
ensuring that “units have the time and the facilities, within a
suitable conditioning environment, to constitute or
reconstitute the capacities needed by the system.”122
These imperative problems at the societal level create
social sub-systems, each to address the respective basic
‘need dispositions’ and therefore of potential ‘motivational commitments’ to
various types of goals and to various patterns of behavior.” See Morse, supra, at
105.
118 “The social system, or structure of social organization, consisting of defined
roles and their associated and institutionalized (=internalized and shared) roleexpectations (= ‘expected performances’ and ‘sanctions.’)” See Morse, supra, at
105.
119 “The culture system, consisting of the heritage of knowledge, beliefs, ideas,
technologies, mores, customs, habits, laws, values, standards, norms, together
with the symbols, both tangible (artifacts) and intangible (language, the arts) that
represent them.” See Morse, supra, at 105.
120 “No one of these systems is entirely independent of the others. The culture
system is the major binding element.” See Morse, supra, at 105.
121 See Morse, supra, at 113.
122 See Morse, supra, at 113-114.
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functional imperative: Goal Attainment manifests, for
example, in the political system; Adaptation manifests in the
economic system.123
Each sub-system can further be
analyzed in terms of these functional imperatives: for
example, the economy can be analyzed in terms of Goal
Attainment (the “Production sub-system”); Adaptation (the
“Investment capitalization sub-system”); Integration (the
“Entrepreneurial sub-system”); and Latency (the “Economic
commitments sub-system”).124
Social action was determined within the structural
framework of personality-social role-culture; and driven by
the functional imperatives of goal attainment-adaptationintegration-latency.
Parsons’ last major theoretical
contribution was to posit that social action was additionally
mediated according to a set of five fundamental “pattern
variables” for interpreting the social situation, mediating
potentially conflicting concepts, and producing the ultimate
social orientation in which action occurred.125
The functional imperatives are transhistorical and
See Morse, supra, at 121-122.
See Morse, supra, at 140-141.
125 See Devereux, supra, at 38-42. The framework for structural analysis are the
pattern variables, guided by three principal criteria: “First, the variables should
be completely general and permit comparisons between groups of any sort
whatever and across cultures… Second, the variables should be relevant for the
action frame of references… Finally, the variables should be relevant for the
analysis of the functional problems about which system differentiation takes
place… The outcome of Parsons’ thinking about these matters was the nowfamous set of pattern variables… These were a set of five dichotomous variables
conceived as constituting universal and basic dilemmas confronting any actor in
any social situation. Parsons argued that each variable represented a
fundamental problem of orientation which the actor would somehow have to
resolve either one way or the other; moreover, he would have to come to terms
with all five before arriving at any determinate orientation…. 1. Affectivity [e.g.
marital bond] -Affective neutrality [e.g. customer bond]…; 2.Specificity
[customer] -diffuseness [marital]…; 3. Universalism [cognitive]-particularism
[cathectic]…; 4. quality-performance…; 5. self-orientation-collectivityorientation….”
123
124
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universal, and the social response to them is evolutionary in
nature: societies evolve towards ever-higher levels of
structural “differentiation” in the management of social
roles.126
Although Parsons’ theory was universalist in
that it posited that all societies would traverse roughly the
same set of structural-functional changes, this progress was
far from inevitable. In fact, societies could fail to progress if
their cultures did not adapt sufficiently to environmental
conditions127: the term evolution implied a race for survival
of the fittest among societies and cultures. Hence Parsons’
theory of “evolutionary universals”: adaptations universally
required in order for societies to progress to modernity.128
This neo-Darwinian, (or more accurately, neoSpencerian),129 perspective also implied the urgency of policy
intervention for those societies that had to date failed to
produce the requisite cultural change for economic
development. As one Parsonian remarked, “There ought to
be interest also in the application of evolutionary theory to
the practical problem of modernization: without economic
and social development some considerable proportion of the
… persons on the planet have a bleak future.”130
See Morse, supra, at 143: “These four functional problems represent four
distinct (yet interdependent) social `ends,’ and constitute the basis of four
corresponding rationalities, the simultaneous application of which is responsible
for the ways in which social systems function. Within a rather undifferentiated
social system, such as a primitive family or tribe, consistency among the four
rationalities and their application is achieved by the institutionalization of role
patterns together with the opportunity for adjustment by direct settlement of
conflicts…. When a society becomes highly differentiated, the possibilities of
inconsistency become far more numerous… The degree of consistency achieved
is a determinant of the stability or instability of the system, any inconsistency
among the four types of rationality or their application being a particularly
important source of conflict and, potentially, of change.”
126

127
128

For a discussion of Herbert Spencer and social Darwinism, see Chantal
Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, UC Davis Law
Review.
130 Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE
129
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Parsons’ reading of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic
through his own structural-functionalist lens helped him to
conclude from this theory that “American society
constituted an evolutionary breakthrough; it displayed a
higher level of organized complexity than any other.”131 It
was at this stage that Parsons’ methodology reached its
zenith,132 disseminating through Parsons-trained academic
appointees to the rapidly expanding field of sociology from
the 1930s to the 1960s.133
In one highly influential application of the pattern
variable analysis, Parsons working with his frequent
collaborator Edward Shils, further streamlined the “pattern
variables” into a general division between “traditional” and
“modern” society.134 The dualistic distinction between
tradition, on the one hand, and modernity on the other,
would be picked up by W.W. Rostow135 and employed
generally in the development policy of the time. Thus,
Parsons’ work helped to establish the groundwork for
modernization theory.
In his drive to develop a
universalistic account of economic growth and its
relationship to governance, however, Parsons explicitly
elided those aspects of Weber that contradicted this
objective.136
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES 1, 20 (1977).
131 Frank J. Lechner, “Talcott Parsons,” in WILLIAM H. SWATOS, JR. EDITOR,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND SOCIETY (1998).
132 PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 28 (1983). (“The influence exerted by
Parsons’s theoretical work over American sociology … cannot be overestimated.
Within the general context of sociological orthodoxy at the time, normally
referred to as structural-functionalism, Parsons reigned supreme.”)
133 PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 28 (1983).
134 Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of
Action
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).
135 Walt Whitman Rostow, Review of “Toward a General Theory of Action,” 5
World
Politics 540 (1953).
136 Parsons describes these himself in The Structure of Social Action (1949, p.v-vi).
In the introduction to Structure of Social Action, he notes that he is not interested
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Parsons believed that his general theory essentially
extended and perfected the insights of Weber’s theory of
ideal types. Parsons asserts that “if Weber had developed
such a systematized general theory, ‘he could hardly have
failed’ to realize that functionalism represents the most viable
approach.”137 Subsequently, however, New Weberians have
demonstrated the ways in which Parsonian universalism not
only misapplied Weber’s typology but, more seriously,
misunderstood Weber’s overarching project.
In
“Deparsonizing Weber,” for example, Cohen et al. strongly
opposed Parson’s reading of Weber as a nascent
functionalist, arguing that Weber himself “rejected
functionalism.”138 They argued that Parsons dramatically
simplified Weber’s analysis (criticizing Parsons for treating a
factor as “decisive rather than … one of several important
considerations.”139 This simplification would have formed
the ground floor in the one size fits all edifice.
A.2. Parsons and Theoretical Shortcut #2: The Determinism
of “Values” in Modernization
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons argued that
Weber and other prominent social theorists had converged
on the centrality of “cultural norms and beliefs—in other

in the “separate and discrete propositions to be found in the works of” the
authors he considers (primarily Weber, Durkheim, Alfred Marshall and Vilfred
Pareto), but in “a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning the
development of which can be traced through a critical analysis of writings of this
group and of their predecessors.” The Structure of Social Action (1949, p.v) This
amounts to an admission that these writers are being read for the ways in which
they support a theory that Parsons himself wishes to develop.
137 COHEN p.230, citing Talcott Parsons, Introduction to Max Weber, The Theory
of Social and Economic Organization 28-29 (1947) (A.M.Henderson and Talcott
Parsons trans.)
138 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13-15, 17-18 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed.
1968).
139 (COHEN p.230).
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words, values” as an explanation for social action.140 While
the “conditions of action” and other environmental factors
played an important role in determining social evolution,
culture was the ultimate cause.141
Defenders of Parsons were careful to point out that
Parsons’ structural-functionalist theory did not focus on
beliefs to the exclusion of other factors.142 Yet Parsons
himself described his work as “culturally determinist.”143
Although the “institutionalization of values” was “a
contingent process,” the “normative pattern” of those values
provided “a society its identity” as the “single most
important functional[ist] facet.” 144 As Parsons argued, the
“concept of values provides the focal center for analyzing
the organization of [social] systems, of societies and of
personalities.”145
It was Parsons’ theory that influenced writers such as
David McLelland to focus on the “achievement motive” in
culture as an explanation for effective social adaptation.146
NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 74 (2004).
Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES, at 1, 8 (1977) (these other factors did “not give direction
to change; direction is given by cultural values”) (emphasis in original). Thus,
for example, “Parsons explains the ultimate failure of the Roman Empire in
terms of the inability ‘to develop a dynamic religious system which could
legitimate and strengthen the enormously expanded societal community’.”
Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in Talcott Parsons, The
Evolution of Societies, at 1, 9 (1977) (citing Talcott Parsons, Societies:
Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, at 92 (1966)).
142 Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES, at 1, 8 (1977) (asserting that Parsons’ version of cultural
determinism “does not mean that cultural developments are the only or even the
main source of social change.” Toby specifically wanted to distinguish Parsons
from the more exclusively cultural explanations of theorists such as Ruth
Benedict. See Toby, supra, at 9; see also RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURAL
CHANGE (1934).
143 TALCOTT PARSONS, SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES,
at 113 (1966).
144 Lechner, supra.
145 Quoted in NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 82 (2004).
146 See DAVID MCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE (citing Parsons).
140
141
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Parsons’ theory of culture and social change also posited a
universalistic theory of societal evolution in a “sequence of
stages”147 – a characteristic that would surface fully in one of
Parsons’ most important intellectual heirs, W.W. Rostow.
Certainly, Weber saw himself and his work as
opposed to the economic determinism of what is sometimes
termed “vulgar” Marxism.148 At the same time, however,
New Weberian scholars have emphasized that Weber also
accepted much of the fundamental wisdom of Marx’s
approach. That is to say, Weber’s theory both diverged and
converged with Marxian analysis.149
The clearest example of Weber’s careful blending of
historical materialist insights with his own analysis might be
his well-known statement that “very frequently the ‘world
images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has
been pushed by the dynamic of interest.”150
Rather than emphasizing the exclusive role of
“values” as engendering capitalistic growth, Weber is
proposing a much more specific role of “ideals.” In
analytical terms, the statement sees ideals as necessary but not
sufficient to effect historical change. The “dynamic of
Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES, at 1, 20 (1977).
148 Guenther Roth, Global Capitalism and Multi-Ethnicity: Max Weber Then and Now,
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 117, 118 (2000) ( “… Weber disclaimed an
‘inner sympathy’ with capitalism, as against the champions of older laissez-faire
doctrines, he defended , as a ‘rather pure bourgeois,’ the imperatives of the
capitalist market place against its many detractors from the right and left… Not a
policy operating with anticapitalist slogans . . . but . . . the resolute insistence on
promoting our bourgeois-industrial … development is the only economic policy
feasible in the long run in the age of capitalism, whether you love it or hate it’
[MWG I/4:672f]”
[cite for vulgar Marxism and for Weber’s opposition to it, see Allen and Parkin]
149 cite Allen, Parkin
150 (pp.277-278, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills trans.) (note that Mills was a prominent leftist sociologist, see Allen.
)
147
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interest” pushes social activity along one “ideals” track over
another. Without this dynamic of interest, therefore, ideals
could not take hold and flourish. At the same time, this
statement tells us, ideals ultimately play the shaping role,
the mold into which underling interests drive social action.
Thus, Weber’s statement that “not ideas, but material
and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct.”151 Weber
sought to explain the important role that norms play in
shaping behavior, resisting an explanation of social action
that looked solely to the structure of the economic “means of
production.” As will be further explored below, however,
Weber’s understanding of norms seemed imbued by a
distinctly dimmer mood than that of Parsons. Weber
explicitly recognized the subordinating role that norms
could play in effectuating the domination of members of
society to the ruling elite. Indeed, in this conceptual
interrelationship between dominant norms and material
interests, Weber’s theory might be read against the work of
subsequent critical theorists in a new light. This will be
explored further below,152 but for present purposes the main
point is that Weber’s theory viewed material interests as a
centrally important factor, interacting with “ideal interests”
and driving social action along the “tracks” laid by those
ideal interests to shape history.
By contrast, New Weberian scholars have pointed out
that Parsons drained much of the influence of the nonnormative from Weber’s theory. Cohen et al argue that “In
attempting to assimilate Weber’s formulations of his own
version of action theory, Parsons asserted that a “focus of
interest on the normative aspects of the action systems” was
basic to Weber’s scheme. … According to Parsons, … ‘there is
(pp.280, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills trans.) (note that Mills was a prominent leftist sociologist, see Allen.
See German original and consider stating it here with an opinion on whether
faithfully translated or not.)
152 See infra.
151
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no such thing as action except as effort to conform with norms’ for
Parsons (1949: 76-77, emphasis added).”153
Thus, while Parsons argued correctly that Weber
had a focus of interest on the normative aspects of action, he
exaggerated by asserting that norms are central to Weber’s
conception of social action. On issues where Weber made no
mention of norms or explicitly denied their importance,
Parsons claimed (to the contrary) that norms were important
to Weber. When Weber stated that norms were of varying
importance, Parsons asserted their central importance.
When nominated other factors as being primary, Parsons
elevated norms to a position of centrality and deemphasized
nonnormative factors. The consequence is that Weber’s
conception of action theory was distorted.154
The New Weberians suggest, by contrast, that in Weber’s
analysis self-conscious value-orientation is only one type of
social action. Moreover, Weber felt that value-rational action
was both potentially antagonistic to, and constrained by, the
instrumentalities of modern statehood.
How does Weber’s analysis of the Protestant ethic in
P.233
Cohen et al:
“Action may be oriented on instrumentally rational, value-rational, effectual or
traditional grounds. That is, the actor’s orientation may be determined (Weber,
1968: 24-25) principally by his ‘expectations as to the behavior of objects … and
of other human beings,’ by his ‘conscious belief in [a] value for its own sake,’ by
his ‘specific affects and feeling states,’ or by ‘ingrained habituation.’ Weber (1968:
29) also noted three types of subjective meaning common in social action: usage,
custom and complex of interests. That is, an action may be performed
repeatedly because of current use, because of long familiarity, or because of
stable opportunities for realizing interests.
“Parsons perceived all three of these types of subjective meaning as
essentially normative. In addition, he viewed as essentially normative three of
the four categories for orienting action: traditionalism, instrumentally rational
action and value rational action… However, a category-by-category analysis
shows that traditional behavior, usages and customs are primarily habitual,
while instrumentally rational behavior and complexes of interests are largely
oriented to expediency rather than to norms. Only value-rational behavior is
primarily normative in any of the senses intended by Parsons.”
153
154
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driving capitalism, a striking example of value-rational
conduct, mesh with this analysis of the types of social
action? The value-rational conduct that gave rise to effective
capitalistic conduct would, like all other types of religiously
motivated behavior, come to be constrained by the very state
and society that arose initially out that behavior.155 This was
one of the paradoxes that Weber underscored: the way in
which the very religious values which initiated modern
activity – industry in the economic sphere, scientific inquiry,
and even the rule of law --- would ultimately create
institutions that would destabilize the values that birthed
them. This destabilization of values was what Weber called
the “disenchantment” of modern society, described above.
Given Weber’s attention to disenchantment from
value-rational action, Parsons’ interpretation of this typology
of social action as value-driven is curious. This emphatic
focus on ideals seems to be inspired more by the Protestant
Ethic than by the source of the typology itself, in Economy and
Society.
The rather exclusive attention to ideals also
manifested itself in Parsons’ analytical distance from
material conditions as causes of social action and
determinants of social relations.
Weber, by contrast,
specifically warned that his intention was not “to substitute
for a one-sided causal materialistic an equally one-sided
spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of
history.”156 Cohen et al argue: “While we cannot be certain
whether Parsons misunderstood the target of Weber’s
critique of ‘Marxian historical materialism,’ he clearly
missed its substantive point. Weber quite clearly retained the
see, e.g., JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF
TRAGEDY 26 (1996) (describing Weber’s theory of capitalism as a “sociological
phenomenon springing up originally from religious convictions, which would
eventually give way to secularization as the entrepreneur continued to
demonstrate his qualifications as a Christian by his business integrity.”)].
156 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC , at 183.
155

50

RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

interest category (including material interest) as a central
motive for action and as an important social force; he
rejected only sociological formulations that assigned an
exclusive attention to self-interest (especially material
interest). In contrast, Parsons very nearly read the interest
category out of Weber altogether, thereby denuding his
work of its attention to the ‘dynamic of interest’ as a basic
motive for action.”157
The excision of nonnormative interests in Weber
served to underscore and possibly to distort Weber’s
discussion of the role of Protestant “values” in producing
capitalistic behavior. Whereas Weber sought to describe
Protestantism as one particular historical source of a more
general phenomenon, the Parsonian approach tends to cut
away and deemphasize this historical and analytical
complexity.
Combined with Parsons’ attraction to
universalistic and prescriptive analysis, this approach can
end up simplifying Weber’s thesis into the proposition that
Protestant values not only helped generate capitalistic
behavior, but that they are actually “necessary” for
capitalism to take root as a general matter. “For Parsons,
revolutions in consciousness, not the inexorable unfolding of
technological power or the contradictions of class society,
provided the critical turning points in history.”158
An endorsement of capitalistic and scientific values
from a normative perspective was part of Parsons’ selfconscious understanding of the intention behind his work.
In his introductory description of the objectives of setting
out a systematic theory of social action, Parsons made clear
that the focus of this theory: “the interpretation of
‘capitalism,’ ‘free enterprise,’ ‘economic individualism,’ as it
Parsons was partially
has been variously called.”159
COHEN P.236 argue
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future., 2004. p 93.
159 (The Structure of Social Action (1949, p.vi).
157
158
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motivated by a special plea directly from Friedrich von
Hayek, who saw160 Weber as an “ideological forerunner” for
a theory of economic growth that eschewed “public
regulation” suggested by Marxian and Keynesian policies.161
Just as the argument for deregulatory politics served
as an important and explicit counterpoint to advocates for
socialist statist policy, the argument for the importance of
beliefs served as an important and explicit counterpoint to
proponents of the view that the primary deficit in the
developing world was the absence of capital. The latter
formed an important part of dependency theory, which
argued that colonizing countries had extracted capital from
colonies in addition to establishing market patterns that
created economic dependency of the peripheral colonies on
the metropolitan center.162
* * *
Weber was a self-described bourgeois163 who strongly
supported the German state164 and one who may have
believed that the developing world was ‘inherently’
disqualified to generate development.165 Yet he became one
of the intellectual forefathers of the modernization
movement. This article suggests that, unfortunately, when it
comes to the application of Weber’s theories to development,
[in Weber’s Protestant Ethic, but I don’t know if Hayek was relying only on
that, have to look more at Hayek and also at this letter]
161 (Kieran Allen, Max Weber, at 7 (citing T. Parsons, “The
Circumstances of My Encounter with Max Weber,” in R. Merton and M.W. Riley
eds., Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the
American Experience, 1980, at pp.38, 42).
162 See Andre Gunder Frank, the Development of Underdevelopment.
For an explicit denunciation of Parsonian methodology see Andre Gunder
Frank,The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology
(London: Pluto Press 1971).
163 (quote)
164 (quote)
165 (quote).
160
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much in development policy has inherited too much from
the Eurocentric sensibility of Weber’s work and not enough
from the sophistication of his analyses. The sophistication of
this theory was not trivial. Streamlined in the service of a
particularly American version of free market capitalism,
Weber’s analysis was stripped of insights that in fact might
have predicted many of the lessons that were learned the
hard way from the application of the “evolutionary
universals” model that developed. The desire to create a
viable and clearly opposed alternative to socialism in the
Cold War era likely inspired Parsons and others simply to
elide and underplay the role that material interests, and
Marxian analysis, had in shaping Weber’s own theory.
Again, the solution threw the baby out with the bathwater:
in gravitating towards an idealist explanation for capitalist
development, the Parsonians set themselves up for policies
that were not only misguided but ineffective.
A.3. Parsons and Theoretical Shortcut #3: The Correlation
Between Modernization and Democracy
Parsons argued that the “necessary breakthroughs”
for modernization were of a piece and included the
contemporaneous rise of capitalism and democracy: “the
institutionalization of the authority of office, the use of
market mechanisms for mobilizing resources, a generalized
legal order, and the democratic association.”166 Parsons did
not devote much attention to exactly how democracy would
arise or how it would operate.167 Rather, Parsons assumed a
naturalistic relationship between modernization and
democracy – as the former emerged, the latter would
Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in Talcott Parsons, The
Evolution of Societies, at 1, 13 (1977).
167 [cite]
166
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naturally take root. In his 1964 essay, Evolutionary Universals
in Society, Parsons explicitly applied evolutionary theory to
identify centralized political legitimacy, the emergence of
political rationalization through bureaucracy, and “the
democratic association with elective leadership and fully
enfranchised membership” as naturally co-evolving hallmarks of
modernity.168
The casual assertion of the link between modern
bureaucracy, capitalism and democracy may have stemmed
from the fact that Parsons did not analyze the role of power
in his list of functional imperatives.169 Rather, Parsons
expressed a highly idealized version of the actual
functioning and social role of “the institutions of political
democracy” such as electoral franchise.170
This was
consistent with this neoclassical orientation in terms of
political and economic theory, and with his objective of
counteracting oppositional theories then competing for
allegiance in the realm of international economic policy.171
Thus, “pessimism was the aspect of Weber’s thought that …
Parsons had labored so hard to downplay in Toward a
Theory of Social Action.”172
Although Parsons recognized coercion as a factor in
Weber’s analysis,173 he nevertheless underplayed that aspect
Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society (1964).
“Had he regarded power in this way, Parsons might have seen that effective
social goals are of necessity those that are desirable from the standpoint of the
powerful. This might have led him to [investigate the] hierarchical definition and
enforcement of social goals….” [p.151] Chandler Morse, The Functional Imperatives,
p.100 in The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination (1961).
170 [pp.298-301] Andrew Hacker, Sociology and Ideology, p.289 in The Social Theories
of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination (1961).
171 Parsons’ “`conservative’ bias” had been oft remarked on – actually it is more
of a classical liberalism: “it is the ideology of John Locke and John Stuart Mill,
the ideology of political liberty and a free society.” [pp.290-291] Andrew Hacker,
Sociology and Ideology, p.289 in The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical
Examination (1961).
172 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004).
173 (Parsons The Structure of Social Action 1949, pp. 658,717; Talcott Parsons,
Max Weber and the contemporary political crisis, Review of Politics vol 4 (1942),
168
169
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of Weber’s analysis in multiple ways. The first was through
his own selective culling of Weber’s theoretical concepts. As
Cohen et al observed, Parsonian theory holds that “common
values are the sine qua non of the social order.”174 Parson’s
reading of Weber not only emphasized normative interests
driving individual activity at the expense of internally
identified non-normative factors such as material interest, as
discussed above, but also emphasized those normative
interests at the expense of externally determined nonnormative factors, such as coercion: “Parsons’ great stress on
the alleged importance of the ‘common value’ in Weber’s
work forced a fundamental reordering of Weberian
perspectives on the significance of ideas and interests in
social action, and eventually resulted in misinterpretation of
Weber’s perspective on domination.”175
The Structure of Social Action accomplishes this reordering partially through omission. Most of Parson’s
treatment of Weber focuses on his sociology of religion,
lending force to the collective-value, normative analysis.
Only a small portion of Structure of Social Action focuses on
Weber’s treatment of power.
Yet power ultimately played a central role in Weber’s
analysis of modern governance. As noted above, Weber’s
theory was inflected by a Nietzschean sensitivity to
“structures of dominancy.”176 New Weberians Kieran Allen
and Cohen et al have argued that a “correct understanding
of Weber’s general sociology is impossible unless founded
on a faithful reading of this theory of” power.177
This bowdlerizing tendency in Parson’s reception of
at p.62.),
174 (COHEN p.236)
175 (COHEN p.236)
176 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 941 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968); see
supra section; Lansmann, supra, at 83.
177 (COHEN p.237); see also Allen chapter 2.
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Weberian was perhaps most famously displayed in his
translation of Weber’s ideal types of governance, or
Herrschaft. The term forms the basis for Weber’s classic and
perhaps best known analysis, his formulation of the ideal
types in social structures as deriving from forms of power or
Herrschaft that are “traditional,” “charismatic” or “formalrational” in nature.
The plain, unvarnished definitions of Herrschaft
in contemporary German-English dictionaries – as “rule” or
“dominion” - seem to capture the term’s blending of
coercion by the elite together with some basic level of
acceptance, if not full consent, by the masses. 178 English
translations of Weber’s Economy and Society, however, have
tended to err on the side of either coercion or consent,
construing Herrschaft as “authority,” highlighting consent, or
“domination,” highlighting coercion.
Guenther Roth, in his translation of Economy and
Society, chose to translate Herrschaft as “domination.”
Roth’s choice of “domination” mirrored that of Reinhard
Bendix, who in his book of Max Weber explicitly discussed
the difficulty of translating Herrschaft, preferred the term
“legitimate domination.”179 Parsons, however, preferred the
Herrschaft: “power, rule, reign” – p.381 – 2002 Cambridge Klett
Comprehensive German Dictionary; "rule, dominion (uber); mastery, power,
control" p.927 Langenscheidts Taschenworterbuch Englisch (1956).
179 In his section on Legal Domination, Bendix begins with a footnote
describing the difficulties of translating Weber’s term Herrschaft:
178

It is difficult to find an English equivalent for the German term
Herrschaft, which emphasizes equally the ruler’s exercise of
power and the follower’s acceptance of that exercise as
legitimate, a meaning which goes back to the relations between
lord and vassal under feudalism.
The English terms
“domination” and “authority” are not equally apt, because the
first emphasizes the power of command whether or not
consent is present, while the second emphasizes the right of
command and hence implies the follower’s acceptance almost
to the exclusion of the ruler’s very real power. Weber wished
to emphasize that both power and consent are problematic, but
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term “leadership.”
Parsons’ rendition of Herrschaft,
therefore, plays up the “consent” side of the term even more
than “authority.”
In a review of Bendix’s “intellectual portrait” of
Weber, Parsons explained: “The term [Herrschaft], which in
its most general meaning I should now translate as
“leadership,” implies that a leader has power over his
followers. But “domination” suggests that this fact, rather
than the integration of the collectivity, in the interest of
effective functioning … is the critical factor from Weber’s
point of view … The former interpretation [does not
represent] the main trend of Weber’s thought, though he
was in certain respects a ‘realist’ in the analysis of power.
The preferable interpretation … is represented especially by
his tremendous emphasis on the importance of legitimation
… legitime Herrschaft [was] for Weber … overwhelmingly the
most significant case….”180
The New Weberians have explored at length the
difficulties of translating Weber’s Herrschaft into English. In
particular, Cohen et al. devoted extensive discussion to the
Parsons’ misuse of the term. Cohen et al. dispute that
Weber’s “prime emphasis was on either (1) leadership in the
interest of effective collectivity functioning or (2)

as a realist in the analysis of power he would have been critical
of any translation that tended to obscure the ‘threat of force’
present in all relations between superiors and subordinates.
For these reasons, I prefer the term ‘domination.’
p.481. Bendix puts his finger on a difficulty of translation in Weber’s concept
subtly blending - and conceptually requiring – both the notion of coercion and
the notion of consent. When unpacked in this way, the seemingly intended
meaning of the term Herrschaft remarkably comes within striking distance of
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Indeed, some Frankfurt School would
employ Weberian concepts their critique of modern society.
180 Talcott Parsons, Review of Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait,
25 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 750 (1960).
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legitimation.”181 Rather, Cohen et al. argue that “Weber did
not suggest that dominant persons act to integrate
collectivities in the interest of effective functioning. Rather,
he treated such individuals as acting in terms of their own
ideal and material interests as they perceive them.”182
Moreover, Cohen et al. found Parson’s emphasis on
legitimating as “no more convincing than Parson’s related
attempt [concerning] leadership.”183 Cohen et al. point to
Weber’s statement that “although Herrschaft does not ‘in
every case … utilize economic power for its foundation and
maintenance,,,,in the vast majority of cases, and indeed in
the most important ones, this is just what happens… and
often to such an extent that the mode of applying economic
means for the purpose of maintaining Herrschaft, in turn,
exercises a determining influence on the structure of
domination.”
Moreover, Cohen et al. argue that, whereas Parsons
emphasized the importance of “belief in legitimacy” in
explaining the basis of power in social structures, Weber
allowed that Herrschaft could be based in “physical coercion;
habituation to which at least under certain conditions Weber
applied the label ‘discipline’; rational calculation of interests,
a specific version of which is founded in relationships of
expertise; and belief in the legitimacy of perceived order.”184
Thus, Weber wrote:
“It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to
persons in positions of power is primarily for (or even at all)
oriented to this belief [in legitimacy]. Loyalty may be
hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups
on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice
for reasons of material interest. Or people may submit from
(COHEN p.237)
COHEN p.238.
183 COHEN p.238.
184 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53-4, 212-214, 942-946 (G. Roth & R.
Wittich ed. 1968).
181
182
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individual weakness and helplessness because there is no
acceptable alternative.”185
Cohen et al. conclude: “In short, contrary to Parsons,
who attempted to equate Herrschaft with legitimate
domination, Weber considered nonlegitimate domination at
least equal in importance to legitimate domination….
Although Weber’s multiple-factor approach is a dominant
motif in his discussions of Herrschaft, a second emphasis is
… on power and not, as Parsons would have it, on
leadership … or legitimacy.”186
As subsequent New Weberians have pointed out,
these difficulties in translation probably have had at least as
much to do with the Anglo-American tradition of political
thought as with linguistics. While Cohen et al. critique the
lack of attention to “nonlegitimate” rule in Weber’s thought,
at least as problematic was the understanding of the term
“legitimate” itself. Weber’s understanding of the term
appears to have been strictly positivist, referring to the
actual willingness of subjects to obey authority rather than to
any normatively valid basis for their obedience. “Weber’s
uncanny ability to equate authority with power flew in the
face of the more optimistic outlook of western political
philosophy which assumed that the Enlightenment’s legacy
had resolved the problem by defining all legitimate
authority as deriving from voluntary consent.”187
Lansmann elaborates on the Weber’s understanding
of legitimation, arguing that it was “not concerned with the
normative question of whether or not that body of rules
ought to be considered legitimate.”188 This approach was
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 214 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968).
(COHEN at p.239)
187 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 62
(1996).
188 Lansmann, supra, at 87: “This is a point where many of Weber’s critics argue
that he has unjustifiably altered the generally accepted meaning of the concept.
Weber ignores the argument that a concept such as ‘legitimate’ has implicit
normative implications and cannot, therefore, be used in a ‘neutral’ manner.
185
186
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shaped by Weber’s methodological affinity both with “legal
positivism and post-Nietzschean skepticism.”189 Eliason
further explores the difference between Anglo-American
political thought and Weber’s post-Nietzschean, antiHegelian approach:
“For an Anglo-American… [l]iberalism means
‘freedoms,’ enshrined politically as rights and protected
by various institutional methods which limit state
authority… The core problem of liberalism is state
power: limiting it, controlling, or alternatively of
justifying its political role which is to be determined by
constitutions and by democracy or more broadly by
consent arising through discussion. Weber, however,
was far removed from all of this. He had no sentimental
attachment to either democracy or parliamentary forms.
‘Rights’ barely exist as a concept in his texts, and when
they appear they do so as a valuable residue of past
fanaticism. … Indeed, he showed little affinity even
with German liberalism, which made its own distinctive
contribution to the liberal tradition with the idea of
Rechstaat, the ideal of a state of laws not of men… Weber
hardly used the word Rechstaat. The explanation for this
is that the word itself has natural-law connotations.
And natural law was alien to Weber, who was very
pronounced in favor of what we might call legal
positivism – or, maybe better, legal realism, since there
were lingering elements of natural law in the legal
positivism of his day…”190

According to Weber’s critics to describe a regime as legitimate must be to refer to
a valued achievement other than the contingent fact that its citizens appear to
obey its laws or just happen to believe it to be legitimate.”
Landesman continues: “Weber was, in many ways, influenced by both legal
positivism and post-Nietzschean skepticism. He was not concerned with the
problem of which regimes are normatively legitimate, but with a different
question: … ‘how can modern regimes legitimate themselves or be held to be
legitimate?’” P.88.
190 Eliaeson, supra, at 136-137.
189
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A.4. Parsons and U.S. Foreign Policy
The “confluence of U. S. foreign policy needs and the
ambitions of Parsons and his collaborators would provide the
foundation for a social scientific theory of social change,…
Parsonian theory would provide a basis for uniting the
particularistic studies being made in Area Studies programs into a
single, coordinated research and policy agenda.”191 In formulating
that agenda, Parsons was particularly motivated by the desire
to provide an “American alternative to Marxism,” as his
theory would subsequently come to be called. 192 In this
Cold War context, Parsons sought to portray Weber - and his
theories about capitalism as interpreted by Parsons - as
“above political conflicts.”193
Parsons explicitly situated his analytical framework of
evolutionary universals in the policy divide between
capitalism and socialism. The notion that the major engine
of growth and development lay in the “beliefs” of members
of society found important support in Max Weber’s
exposition of the role of Protestant ideals in spurring
capitalist development in Western Europe.
Parsons was motivated to establish the universality of
his theory at least in part out of the same concerns that
animated his endorsement of normative factors, namely a
desire to exclude and delegitimate rival Marxian accounts of
economic growth.
In fact, Parsons declared “special
reasons” for downplaying the role of
nonnormative
interests, and underplaying the problematic conceptual role
of democracy, in his reading of Weber.194 These reasons
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future. 2004. p 73.
(P.177, Gouldner, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology, cited in Kieran Allen,
Max Weber at 7.)
193 “Weber thus entered the canon of American sociology as a ‘value free’
sociologist.” (Allen, Max Weber, at p.8. Discuss the value free issue a bit more
here - see Allen at p.73, Parkin.)
194 See T. Parsons, “On ‘De-Parsonizing Weber,’ American Sociological Review
October 1975 at p.668.
191
192
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related to his desire to deprivilege and delegitimate rival
accounts.195 In particular, excising Weber’s sociocultural
“pessimism” from his own theory allowed Parsons to “craft
a Weberian theory that permitted [the] image of American
modernity as a wonderful thing.”196
Parsons sought not only to emphasize the importance
of capitalist beliefs, but also to situate this causal variable in
a universalist analysis of economic growth and social
change. Central tenets of modernization theory were that (1)
there is a universal path towards economic development
which features the emergence of a highly differentiated
social structure; (2) this path features the centrality of free
market entrepreneurs; (3) states that wish to succeed in
economic development should do as much as possible to
free constraints on entrepreneurs and investors.197
The dependentista development theorist Andre Gunder
Frank observed that, although Parsons himself was not
primarily focused on the developing world, “[a]rguably
"development" was the field in which Parsonianism became
the most influential, even though it was rather far removed
from his own immediate concerns. It was Parsons who
translated Weber into American ..., and it was post-War but
Cold War America that used Parsonized Weber to conquer
the post-colonial Third World in apparent competition with
the Soviet Union and China.”198
According to Kieran Allen, Parsons worked with the
See T. Parsons, “On ‘De-Parsonizing Weber,’ American Sociological Review
October 1975 at p.666, seeking to “clarify ... the relation between economic theory
and sociological theory.”
196 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004).
197 This was the view, for example, represented by Hayek’s reading of Weber.
198 Andre Gunder Frank post. Frank was a central proponent of dependency
theory, and also was perfectly aware of the interconnections between Parsons, as
an interlocutor of Weber, and modernization theorists such as W.W. Rostow.
[Frank argues that Clifford Geertz, Robert Bellah, Marion Levy, Florence
Kluckhon, Homans et al made direct inputs into development theory and policy.
Investigate this.]
195
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CIA-sponsored “Congress for Cultural Freedom.” Allen
describes the Congress of Cultural Freedom as an
“organization that sought to wage an intellectual struggle for
the hearts and minds of left leaning intellectuals.”199 While
(Allen at p.8 [Other scholars involved with the Congress for Cultural
Freedom, such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Lipset, interpreted Weber as
supporting a reading of market-oriented democracy as constituting the endpoint, for both pragmatic and ontological reasons, of human evolution. Daniel
Bell wrote The End of Ideology (1960), which viewed Weber as an important
intellectual predecessor of the pragmatic argument (see D. Bell, The End of
Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, 1960, at p.279).
Seymour Lipset also relied on Weber’s theories for the ontological argument that
liberal democracy decisively represented the “good society itself in operation.”
See Lipset, ‘The End of Ideology’ in C. Waxman ed., The End of Ideology Debate
(1969 at p.69). Together, Edward Shils, Daniel Bell and Seymour Lipset, all
finding intellectual support in Weber, formed the American center of the
Congress for Cultural Freedom. See Scott-Smith at p.443] [Gilles Scott-Smith
provides a detailed history of the rise and plateau of the Congress for Cultural
Freedom. See Giles Scott-Smith, “The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the End of
Ideology and the 1955 Milan Conference: 'Defining the Parameters of Discourse'
in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 3, 437-455 (2002). Rather than
ideological neoliberals, both Bell and Lipset supported an approach that would
view itself as “non-ideological” and as essentially espousing some version of an
“Atlantic consensus” finding common ground between European social
democracy and American New Deal-ism. See Scott Smith at p.442. In the early
phase of the CCF, this brand of moderate welfare statist politics served as an
alternative to the threat of “hard-line” Marxism and totalitarianism. After the
death of Stalin in 1953, and the perceived decline of the hard-line
Marxist/totalitarian alternative, the members of the CCF began to view the
differences between various brands of industrial democracy as essentially minor,
and the “end of ideology” discourse was born. See Scott-Smith at pp.438,440.
Henceforth, the challenge for the modern Western state was a scientistic one
related to managing productivity and engineering specific solutions to social
problems within a broadly Fordist context. See Scott-Smith at p.441. The CCF
soon faced challenges both from those espousing a more deregulatory approach Hayek was a vocal “dissenter” within the CCF’s “Atlantic consensus” (See ScottSmith at p.451). It also began to face challenges from the global South, beginning
with India but soon burgeoning into the state organizers of the Non-Aligned
Movement. See Scott-Smith at pp.454, 455. The voices from these quarters
seemed to be calling for a revival of socialist and authoritarian politics, a
challenge that Scott-Smith describes as ultimately too foreign and too large for
the short-lived statist “Atlantic consensus” of the CCF. See Scott-Smith at p.455
(“ the gap between West and South was much greater than that between the USA
and Western Europe, and the CCF would have difficulties in exporting its ideas
beyond the ‘Atlantic consensus’ of the Euro-American intelligentsia”).]
199
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the CCF endorsed a moderate Fordism,200 the interpretation
of Weber in Parsons emphasized Weber’s espousal of freemarket capitalism in the Protestant Ethic, combining that
with Weber’s notion of ideal types to create a potent theory
of modernization.
Based at Harvard’s Department of Social Relations
(DSR), Parsons was able to work with contemporaries to
shape an agenda for social science that could be immediately
transferred to U.S. foreign policy initiatives.201 The DSR,
underwritten by the Carnegie Corporation, sponsored
scholarly exchanges with Edward Shils and others at the
University of Chicago for the purpose of establishing a
single, general account of modernity in the social sciences. 202
The Congress for Cultural Freedom itself stopped short of free market
economics, its function ultimately being instead to build support for a more
moderate form of market-oriented government, compatible with American New
Deal politics and European social democracy, that could serve as a viable
alternative to leftists. The CCF’s theoretical center seemed to rely on a reading of
Weber that saw, in Weber’s discussions of bureacracy, support for a Fordist state.
201 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 73 (2004). Gilman’s description of the
influence of Parsons in the emergence of this scholarly agenda is worth quoting
at length:
200

…U. S. foreign policy needs and the ambitions of Parsons and his collaborators
would provide the foundation for a social scientific theory of social change,
which would eventually come to be known by the name modernization theory.
[Parsons’ Department of Social Relations or DSR] would shape modernization
theory…. First, Parsons articulated more fully than any other contemporary
American scholar … the concept of modernity that would provide a
fundamental, if usually implicit, template for both intellectuals and policy
makers in their understanding of the desirable direction and ultimate goal of
change in the postcolonial world. Second, [DSR] members helped redirect
postwar social theory away from social critique and toward the creation of a
descriptive … theory of human action…. This social theory would help justify
the creation of technologies of social reform, mostly applied to non-Western
countries. Third, the DSR was the institutional fountainhead for the promotion of
Parsonian social theory, which provided the foundation for modernization
theory. …[T]he DSR provided an institutional presence for the employment and
training of students of modernization. Most of the sociologists associated with
modernization theory had some affiliation with the DSR as either professors or
collaborators.
202 Id.
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This account contained all of the qualities described
above. The definition of modernity as occurring through
evolution along a single, universal path, characterized and
spurred primarily by social “values,” and leading to a highly
“differentiated” social structure in which bureaucratic
governance, modern capitalism, and democracy all naturally
co-existed. Parsons viewed the United States as occupying
the apex of this evolutionary trajectory. “Moreover, since
historical change had to come from outside the system, Americans
were obligated to go out and help other societies get moving
toward greater differentiation.”203 Parsons’ prescriptions for
“help” were “welcomed with especial warmth in development
studies.”204 The application of Parsonian analysis to the objective
of economic development would produce one of the leading policy
frameworks of the mid-to-late twentieth century, Modernization
Theory. 205
B. W.W. Rostow:
Modernization
Economic Development Policy

Theory

Meets

The most well-known of modernization theorists, W.W.
Rostow, eagerly absorbed Parsons’ scholarship and had
“align[ed his] pronouncements with the vision of modernity
that Parsons painted.”206 Moreover, Rostow shared and
extended Parsons’ enthusiasm for concretizing U.S. social
science in the form of U.S. foreign policy.207 Because of
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future., 2004. p 88
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future., 2004. p 79.
205 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future. 2004. p 73.
206 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 73 (2004).
207 “The infectious sense of excitement, of being on the verge of unlocking the
mysteries of human sociability, appears throughout the writings of
modernization
theorists (and indeed most social scientists of this period). `A very big
scientific development has been rapidly gathering force,’ Parsons explained
to Dean Buck. `I will stake my whole professional reputation on the statement
that it is one of the really great movements of modern scientific thought.’
203
204
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Rostow’s enormous influence in economic development
theory and U.S. foreign policy, this methodological
alignment proved among the most significant channels for
the transmission of Parsons’ understanding of Weberian
theory – and of Parsons’ Theoretical Shortcuts.
B.1. Rostow and Theoretical Shortcut #1 (“One-Size-FitsAll”): From “Evolutionary Universals” to “Stages of
Growth”
Parsons and Rostow shared a methodological
ambition to conceptualize “modernization” as “a
comprehensive and cohesive process that entailed what Max
Weber had called ‘rationalization.’”208 As such, both
theorists ignored Weber’s own cautions regarding an
evolutionary understanding of his “ideal types.”209 Both
theorists helped to divert Weberian historical analysis into a
“one-size-fits-all” prescriptive approach.
Walt Whitman Rostow was among the most
influential transmitter of this approach in economic
development policy.210 In the Process of Development (1952)
Walt Whitman Rostow agreed that synthetic social science was nothing less
than revolutionary: `The revolution may be defined as an effort to achieve a
more unified application of the social sciences. . . .,’ a project that he believed
would “get much assistance from the current generation of political scientists
who are increasingly
committed to the study of comparative politics in non-Western societies.”
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future. 2004. p 78.
208 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 5 (2004).
209 See Wolfgang Schlucter, Psychophysics and Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO WEBER 59, 70 (2000) (arguing that Weber “fundamentally rejected organic
analogies in economics and sociology” and by extension social Darwinism).
210 Michael Adamson, Social Scientists as Policymakers, 14 HUMANE STUDIES REVIEW
(2000); David Steigerwald, The Paradoxes of Kennedy Liberalism, 28 REVIEWS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 636 (2000). (See Gunder Frank post, arguing that Parsons was
“arguably with What Whitman Rostow one of the ... defining
theoretical/ideological leaders with the widest influence on cold war rhetoric
and policy....”).
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and The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
(1962),211 Rostow carried elements of Parsons’ analysis to
the more streamlined world of development policy and
practice. 212
The Stages of Economic Growth, in particular, stylized
the analytical components of Parsons’ work, causing a
deepening of Parsons’ key elisions of Weber. Rostow
dramatically simplified Parsons’ analysis of “evolutionary
universals.” Parsons had maintained a belief in the validity
of the concept, but in his exposition generally sought to
maintain complexity.213 Rostow, on the other hand, reduced
social change throughout all of human history to five stages
of economic growth: 214
1. the “traditional society” stage (“whose structure is
developed within limited production functions, based
on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on
pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical
world”)215;
2. the “preconditions for takeoff” stage (the period in
which society transitions from a traditional formation
to one ready to “exploit the fruits of modern science,
Other works by Rostow include: The American Diplomatic Revolution; Essays on
the British Economy of the Nineteenth Century; The Process of Economic Growth; The
Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850; The Dynamics of Soviet
Society; The Prospects for Communist China; An American Policy in Asia; A Proposal:
Key to an Effective Foreign Policy; The United States in the World Arena; Politics and
the Stages of Growth; and The Diffusion of Power.
212 Michael Latham argues that Parsons and Edward Shils had developed the
central tenets of modernization theory by the 1950s. MICHAEL E. LATHAM,
MODERNIZATION AS IDEOLOGY: AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 'NATION-BUILDING'
IN THE KENNEDY ERA (2000).
213 [CHECK]
214 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 4 (“It is possible to
identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five
categories.”).
215 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 4.
211
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fend off diminishing returns, and thus to enjoy the
blessings and choices opened up by the march of
compound interest”);216
3. “the take off” stage (the “interval when the old blocks
and resistances to steady growth are finally
overcome”);217
4. the “drive to maturity” stage (“a long interval of
sustained if fluctuating progress, as the now regularly
growing economy drives to extend modern
technology over the whole front of its economic
activity”);218 and
5. the “age of high mass consumption” (“where, in time,
the leading sector shift towards durable consumers’
goods and services”).219
Weber’s ideal types had morphed into Parsons’ evolutionary
universals and now into Rostow’s “five stages.”220
Indeed, Rostow’s confidence in the universality of this
sequence was such that he felt confident even in estimating a
universal time-frame for movement across the stages once
the “take-off” triggered the process of sequential change:
“Historically, it would appear that something like sixty years
was required to move a society from the beginning of takeRostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 6.
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 7.
218 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 9.
219 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 10.
220 Rostow’s contemporary Alexander Gerschenkron adopted a more
sophisticated theory of modernization, which ultimately eclipsed Rostow’s in
terms of respectability in the academy. Gerschenkron also advocated a “linear
stages” version of economic development and famously developed “historical
backwardness” as a descriptive ideal type. See Alexander Gerschenkron,
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 1962. He also believed that
countries could sometimes skip stages through the adoption of advanced
technology and through managed state intervention.
216
217
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off to maturity.”221
The only qualification Rostow felt it necessary to add
to this general theory arose in the cause of a society’s initial
propulsion into this sequence. Although the “preconditions
for take-off were initially developed, in a clearly marked
way, in Western Europe… [t]he more general case in
modern history… saw the stage of preconditions arise not
endogenously but from some external intrusion by more
advanced societies.”222
In his “Stages of Growth” theory, Rostow adopted the
theoretical inclination of Parsons towards a universal
structuralism. In pursuing this inclination, Parsons and
Rostow shared more, methodologically, with Marxian rather
than Weberian theory. For Rostow in particular, the
construction of a methodologically similar alternative to
Marxian structuralism appears to have been fully
intentional. As the subtitle of Stages of Economic Growth
indicates – a “Non-Communist Manifesto” – an explicit goal
of this account was to counter the historical materialist focus
on economic dynamics of class conflict.223
This simplistic universalism was not shared by all
modernization theorists. Rostow’s contemporary Alexander
Gerschenkron, for example, produced a theory of historical
transition to modernization that, although sharing its
general orientation with Rostow, nevertheless introduced
important complications in the form of acknowledging the
contingent nature of the preconditions stage, and as well as
the role of differences in initial material conditions in
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 10.
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 6.
223 Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid
(2001); Michael Adamson, Social Scientists as Policymakers, Humane Studies
Review Vol. 14, No. 3 (“During the 1940s and 1950s, Rostow developed his
"stages" theory as a general model of social development to counter Karl Marx's
framework for relating socioeconomic factors to social revolution. He presented
his theory in public policy forums as practical knowledge for using foreign aid to
conduct economic warfare.”)
221
222
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influencing and differentiating trajectories of modernization
among “latecomers.”224 Gerschenkron’s personally intimate
acquaintance with the “historically backward” society of his
native Odessa probably helped to enhance his taste for
methodological complexity. While Gerschenkron’s theories
eventually have come to prevail favor over Rostow’s much
more simplied version, in the immediate context of midcentury U.S. foreign policy it was Rostow’s approach that
prevailed.225
B.2. Rostow and Theoretical Shortcut #2: Modernity and
“Values”
Rostow also deepened the Parsonian emphasis on
normative factors, and in particular of capitalistic values, as
a causal explanation for societal “evolution.” Indeed, the
primary determinant of societal “takeoff” was the emergence
of a capitalist class both willing and able to take risks and
make investments of the kind necessary to jumpstart the
process of rapid economic growth thought to be
characteristic of the modernization process.
While this component of Rostovian theory is often
read for the proposition that capital formation is central to
economic development, notable in Rostow’s own
formulation is the emphasis on values. The “external
intrusion of advanced societies” is important primarily
because it “set[s] in motion ideas and sentiments which
initiated the process by which a modern alternative to the
traditional society was constructed.”226 It is this shift in
values which allows the capitalist class to emerge: “The idea
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A
Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962
225 Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid
(2001);
226 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, at 6.
224
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spreads … that economic progress is possible…. New types
of enterprising men come forward… willing to mobilize
savings and to take risks in pursuit of profit or
modernization.”227
Rostow’s treatment here recalls, of course, Weber’s
account of the Protestant Ethic. Weber’s account, however,
explicitly identified itself as a corrective to, rather than a
replacement for, a “one-sided materialistic” view of
historical change.228 Rostow, by contrast, appears to view
the ideas of progress and profit as uniquely independent
variables.
Changes in “values,” rather than codeterminative of historical change, appear to become their
sole cause.
B.3. Rostow and Theoretical Shortcut #3: Modernity and
Democracy
Like Parsons, Rostow also glossed over the
relationship of democracy to economic growth and the
market. Rostow asserted an easy, natural relationship
between the emergence of economic growth and political
democracy.229 The emphasis on democracy meshed with the
goal of providing an attractive alternative to revolutionary
socialism: “As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. put it, modernization
theory “represented a very American effort to persuade the
developing countries to base their revolutions on Locke
rather than on Marx.”230
Rostow shared with modernization theorists
generally the “belief that modernization would bring
American-style health, wealth, and democracy to traditional
nations.” 231 Even in the early 1960s, for example, Rostovian
Rostown, Stages of Economic Growth, at 6-7.
See supra cite.
229 See, e.g., W.W. Rostow, View from the Seventh Floor, (1964), at 25.
230 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 10 (2004).
231 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 9 (2004).
227
228
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fellow traveler Lucian Pye criticized modernization theory
for its “‘unreasoned expectation’ that democracy was
‘inevitable’” once economic take-off had begun.232
Although both Parsons and Rostow oversimplified
the relationship between modernity and democracy by
assuming that the former would promote the latter
automatically, the Rostovian version of this
oversimplification parted ways importantly from that of
Parsons. Parsons assumed away the problem of democracy
by neglecting to elaborate on the particular dynamics of its
emergence; Rostow assumed away the problem by
embracing the necessity of authoritarian rule as an
important part of “setting the stage” for democracy.233
Rostow and other “high modernists,” in James Scott’s
terminology, endorsed the use of state force to create
“administrative order” while the institutional elements
required to support bureaucratization and economic growth
were put into place.234 The “trade-off” between
development and democracy seemed acceptable particularly
“[i]n the context of an American cold war mentality that
considered `developmental dictatorships’ preferable to
‘vulnerable’ democracies.”235
B.4. Rostovian Modernization Theory and U.S. Foreign
Policy
Mark T. Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 421, 434 (2003) (quoting Lucian W. Pye,
Politics, personality and nation-building: Burma’s search for identity (1962), pp. xv–
xvi, 7, 38, 42.); see also Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse
in South Korea in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA
STUDIES 55 (2001), at 59.
233 see also Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South
Korea in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES
55 (2001), at 59.
234 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).
235 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 11 (2004).
232
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Rostow’s streamlined analytical framework came to
characterize “modernization theory” generally: an account
of economic growth and social change that focused on the
importance of the expanding capitalist nucleus and the shift
in beliefs. Rostow’s career shows both how this strain of
neo-Weberian theory and scholarship on economic growth
and social change impacted U.S. policy in developing
countries. 236
Rostow adopted a variety of rhetorical
approaches in urging U.S. policymakers to adopt and
implement modernization theory. Rostow’s efforts under
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson included an
extended involvement in the establishment of the Alliance
for Progress in Latin America.237
Contemporaneously with the publication of The Stages
of Economic Growth, Rostow began to implement his analysis
in service to the U.S. government, first with Office of
Strategic Services (the precursor to the CIA) during World
War II, then as chairman of the policy planning council of
the State Department under Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, and finally as a special assistant for national
security affairs to President
Johnson.
Rostow’s
development advice quite often explicitly took into account
anti-communist foreign policy objectives at the center of the
Cold War.238 In this last position, Rostow served directly
Other influential modernization theorists included Lucian Pye, Max Milliken
and Daniel Lerner. See David Steigerwald, The Paradoxes of Kennedy
Liberalism, 28 Reviews in American History 636 (2000).
237 Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid
(2001). Rostow and others experienced most success under Kennedy’s
administration, which actively sought guidance from the academy. See David
Steigerwald, The Paradoxes of Kennedy Liberalism, 28 Reviews of American
History 636 (2000).
238 See, e.g., Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, “Food Aid to
Egypt” (June 18, 1966) (weighing the utility of aid to the Nasser regime in Egypt
against the objective of reducing Soviet influence) (available from the Jewish
Virtual Library, at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/USIsrael/frus061866.html). Also at Source: Schwar, Harriet Dashiell. (Ed.). Foreign
236
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under Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy.239 In this capacity,
Rostow served as a primary architect of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam as part of U.S. anti-communist foreign policy.240
One important initial effect of translating Rostow’s
theory into U.S. policy was a focus on development aid in
general.
Rostow succeeded in persuading the U.S.
government to move towards longer-term aid to developing
country governments, although efforts in this regard never
matched the Marshall Plan.241 Rostow believed that the U.S.
government could help to support a capitalistic framework
that would enable the preconditions for takeoff - conditions
conducive to entrepreneurship – to emerge. 242
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1964-1967. DC:
GPO, 2001. In the Middle East, Rostow’s preeminent objective appeared to be to
promote stability so as to prevent the fracturing of the Arab states into Soviet
alliances. Hence Rostow also advocated pressuring Israel to make concessions to
Palestinian negotiators so as to prevent a buildup of tension in the region. See
Memo to President Johnson, “Rostow Urges Johnson to Pressure Israel” (January
5, 1968), at Source: "Memorandum from [Walt] Rostow to President Johnson,"
Smith, Louis J. (Ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, ArabIsraeli Dispute 1967-1968. DC: GPO, 2001. and also
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Frus33.html.
239 There is a White House file with Rostow’s correspondence while in this
position. Other files are held by the University of Texas.
240 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The U.S. Government
and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 19611964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985). (Describing W. W.
Rostow as among the “foremost leaders in the development of U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine and programs” and as a leading and persistent
advocate for concerted military action in Vietnam.) Chapter 1, titled “The 1961
Decision To Stand Firm In Vietnam,” recounts in detail Rostow’s consistent
advocacy for military action in Vietnam - and in ensuring that such planning
occurred without Congressional participation – from the early stages of U.S.
involvement following the 1961 decline of the rightist Laotian government.
241 See, e.g, Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea
in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 55 (2001), at 57-61.
In fact, at the takeoff stage Rostow advocated the support of broader welfare
state support. See Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, pp.62-63.
242 Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid
(2001); Michael Adamson, Social Scientists as Policymakers, Humane Studies
Review Vol. 14, No. 3 (“Based on his reading of British and American economic
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With other development economists of the time,243
Rostow also endorsed “unbalanced growth”244 – that is, a
focus on supporting key industries rather than attempting to
address more broadly the infrastructural and societal
conditions of economic production. The unbalanced growth
model operated on the assumption that accelerating growth
in these key industries would create “spillover gains” that
would bring the rest of the economy along – a theory that
later became known as “trickle-down” economics.
Unbalanced growth policy implemented Rostow’s
focus on the expanding capitalist nucleus because it
envisioned a core of entrepreneurs taking a leadership role
in these key industries. The conception of developing societies
as “dual” economies split between traditional and modern
segments characterized much of the development economics of
this period. This conception could be reinterpreted as yet another
“example of the utility of binary thinking within a Parsonian
model.”245
Additionally, because it emphasized the importance
of investors, this model could support the country’s
continued receptivity to foreign capital, and continued
openness to the international marketplace.246 Moreover, U.S.
history, Rostow identified a lack of capital formation as the primary obstacle
preventing poor countries from rapidly modernizing during the critical period as
they emerged from colonial rule. Rostow recommended that Washington
provide the requisite funds that would serve as a catalyst for the achievement of
"takeoff," or rapid economic growth. "Takeoff" would lead to a period of "selfsustained growth," which would make the world's poor less inclined to foment
political unrest and agitation.”)
243 E.g. Albert Hirschman is among the best known of the advocates for
“unbalanced growth.” See Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic
Development (1958).
244 See, e.g, Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea
in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 55, 61 (2001).
245 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future, 2004. p 83.
See, e.g, Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea
in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 55, 60 (2001).
(“Within this approach, what kind of economic structure should be
246
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economic surplus could be channeled into trade, aid and
investment projects in developing countries.247 Indeed, an
important dynamic of the model was its role in boosting U.S.
economic interests. 248
An examination of Rostovian modernization theory
also reveals that U.S. policy in turn affected and altered the
analytical framework of modernization theory. In particular,
the military and geopolitical objectives of the U.S. in this
time frame led to increasingly greater emphasis on the
importance of “nation-building.”249 Nation-building not
only served the goal of modernization within a developing
country, however, but also served the goals of regional order
and stability – crucial to Cold War era U.S. policy.
In early modernization theory, nation-building and
democracy-building were intertwined.250 Because nationbuilding furthered development, and under modernization
theory the development of capitalistic economic growth
naturally facilitated the development of democracy, it
followed that nation-building would promote democracy.251
recommended? It was not to be an independent economy, but one which had a
place within the international capitalist economy. On the one hand this was
related to the speeded up economic development, because the Third World
should continue to accept a great amount of foreign capital and various kinds of
developed skills and technology.”) Rostow, Milliken and Pye were particularly
influential in shaping U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. See id.
247 See Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, at pp.93-100.
248 See Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth at pp.6-8: The economic
development program outlined in the balance of this book is conceived as one of
the instruments for carrying out the task of helping create an environment within
which American society can thrive.”) “
249 Michael E. Latham, Modernization As Ideology: American Social Science and
'Nation-Building' in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000).
250 Mark T. Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 421, 425 (2003) (“The idea of
nationhood carried withit a commitment, at least in the abstract, to democracy,
human rights and universalsuffrage”)
251 See, e.g., James S. Coleman, ‘The political systems of the developing areas’, in
The politics of the developing areas, ed. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 537–9; see alsoMark T. Berger,
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A 1960 Presidential Task Force report on which Rostow
collaborated outlined the intended mutual reinforcement of
nation-building and democracy-building objectives: “The
new aid program must recognize these motivations and
provide the resource incentive for local leaders to direct
nationalistic forces into constructive channels of building
democratic nations. It should give support especially to the
leaders who are eager to modernize society...” 252
In practice, and in keeping with the gist of “high
modernism,” nation-building concerns increasingly took
priority often took priority over the promotion either of
economic development or democracy.253The Cold War
environment meant that “order and stability were always
more important than democracy as far as most
modernization theorists were concerned.”254 Nils Gilman
writes,
Conceptualizing the passage to modernity as a brief
transitional period, with political instability and the
concomitant threat of Communist takeover as the main
risks, many modernization theorists began to suggest
that the United States should promote the most rapid
possible passage through this dangerous “stage of
growth”— by whatever means necessary. Ultimately,
this theory would justify U. S. intervention in Vietnam
Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development
Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–1975, 34 Journal
of Southeast Asian Studies 421 at 429 (2003) (“Early theorists were at least
rhetorically committed to democracy,often seeing it as the direct result of
economic development and the key to political stability.…At the same time, this
conception of political development was elitist and technocratic, and even in the
1950s stability was regarded as more important than democracy – an emphasis
that would become more pronounced in the 1960s.”)
252 Task Force Report, Dec. 31, 1960, National Security File(NSF): Subjects:
Foreign EconomicPolicy, Box 297, John F. Kennedy Library(JFKL).
253 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (1999).
254 Mark T. Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 421, at 426 (2003).
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on the grounds that such action promoted
modernization. 255

The dynamics of this “reverse” influence from U.S. policy
concerns back to practice became even more pronounced in
subsequent strains of modernization theory. In the emphasis
on modernization “by any means necessary,” and the
acceptability of sacrificing democratic governance towards
this end, Rostovian “modernization theory would in
Gilman’s words “represent liberalism’s entry into this hall of
twentieth-century ideological horrors.”256
C. Another Path: Moderate Parsonianism in Development
Studies
While modernization theory came to dominate much
of U.S. development policy in the early postwar era, another
Parsonian trajectory gained significant ground in the
academy although ultimately enjoying less salient influence
in the field. This strain of Parsonian analysis generally took
care to retained greater analytical complexity. Although the
Parsonian focus on social patterns and structures still
characterized this work, these “Moderate Parsonians”
NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 12 (2004).
NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 11 (2004). Eventually, later
modernization theorists like Samuel Huntington would focus on the “strong
state” as the pre-eminent concern, downplaying the role of the shift in values
towards the “expanding capitalist nucleus” or the supposed symbiotic
emergence of political democracy. See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, Political order in
changing societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968);Huntington, The
soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations (Cambridge:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1957); Changing patterns of military politics, ed. Samuel
Huntington (New York: FreePress, 1962 “Samuel Huntington is generally seen
as one of the most prominent exponents ofthe shift from classical modernisation
theory, with its psychological orientation and its apparent emphasis on
democracy, to the politics-of-order and military modernization theory.” Mark T.
Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 421 at 442 (2003).
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tended to eschew the sweeping cross-historical and crossgeographical conclusions of modernization theory. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the political valence of this strain of
development studies tended to track a more moderate
liberalism, as opposed to the concertedly classical-liberal
starting point of modernization theory.
A somewhat more self-critical and other-regarding
sensibility seemed to characterize this more moderate
Parsonianism. The focus on cultural variables arose, in part,
out of the realization by these development experts while
working in the field that “`even though "we knew all of the
answers," very few of them worked. Initially we were simply
insensitive to the (1) cultural differences, (2) indigenous
motivating forces, and (3) different value systems. Often one
of the greatest mistakes Americans make . . . is the
assumption that the response of foreigners can be predicted
upon the basis of our own value system.”’257 Thus, for
example, an early Parsonian moderate Albert Hirschman
concluded that “I set out to learn about others, and in the
end learned about ourselves.”258
Certainly, Hirschman sought to establish general
conclusions regarding strategies for development.
In
particular, Hirschman became known for the “unbalanced
growth” approach to spurring industrialization,259 and its
accompanying concepts of “forward” and “backward”
Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer,
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 13 (citing p. xxii of
Strassor, G. (1974). Keynote address: Technology transfer revisited. In Manning,
G. K. Technology Transfer: Successes and Failures (pp. xv-xxii). San Francisco: San
Francisco Press; citing also Hirschman, A. O. (1967). Development Projects
Observed. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. ).
258 Albert Hirschman, A Dissenter’s Confession: The Strategy of Economic
Development Revisited, in G.M. Meier and D. Seers ed., Pioneers in
Development (1984).
259 Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 63-70 (defining
development as a “chain of disequilibria” manifesting in a “see-saw” effect
whereby concentrated growth in one sector would be followed by “catching-up”
effects in other sectors.
257
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linkage.260 Hirschman’s theories, however, moderated both
the universalism and the market orientation of the
modernization theorists.
Hirschman disavowed the “laissez-faire” tendencies
of theorists like McLelland and Hagen.261 And, regarding
integration of developing-country economies into the
international marketplace, he evinced caution, warning
against the dangers of “polarization effects” that might arise
if developing-country economic activity became displaced
by developed-country competition.262
Although less dogmatically neoliberal than Rostow,
with “unbalanced growth” Hirschman distanced himself
from more emphatically Keynsian policies of demand-side
development policy.263 Hirschman’s approach emphasized
supply-side concepts such as savings, investment and
“trickling-down” effects.264 Hirschman shared the general
liberal orientation and attraction to universalism of Rostow,
Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 100 (defining
backward linkage effects as those arising when industrial economic activity
induces “attempts to supply through domestic production the inputs needed in
that activity”; and defining forward linkage effects as those arising when
industrial economic actors “attempt to utilize [their] outputs as inputs in some
new activities.”)
261 Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 2 n.3; see also
Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress at 5 (1963).
262 Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 188.
263 Hirschman criticized the “balanced growth” model because it was “derived
from the demand side…. It is argued [that] to make development possible it is
necessary to start, at one and the same time, a large number of new industries
which will be each others’ clients through the purchases of their workers,
employees and owners.” Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at
51. Hirschman criticized this model in part because he felt it was unrealistic: “if
a country were ready to apply the doctrine of balanced growth, then it would not
be underdeveloped in the first place.” Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic
Development, at 54. The balanced growth model was associated with Paul
Rosenstein-Rodan’s “theory of the big push,” and accordingly a somewhat more
statist view of development policy and planning.
264 See Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 35-44
(focusing on the “ability to invest” and the “complementarity of investment”)
and 187-190 (focusing on “trickling-down” effects)
260
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but in more moderate form.
In fact, Hirschman rebelled against the stronger
universalizing tendencies of modernization theory, seeking
instead to “underline the multiplicity and creative disorder”
of dynamics of growth and development.265 The overall
message of The Strategy of Economic Development appeared to
endorse careful case-by-case analysis over one-size-fits-all
policy.266 Perhaps because of this sensibility, Hirschman’s
field experience included much more direct consultation for
developing-country governments than that of the U.S.
government-centered Rostow.267
Hirschman’s understanding of Weber caused him to
acknowledge the possibility of the “hiding hand”; that is the
possibility of unintended consequences of development
policy resulting in part from inadequate knowledge of or
sensitivity to the particular interests and motives regarding
economic production in a given locale.268 The “hiding hand”
analysis demonstrates how the “one-size-fits-all” critique of
Weber extends far beyond the normative problem of
“ethnocentricity”:269
“one-size-fits-all”
policies
are
problematic from a pragmatic perspective simply because
Albert Hirschman, A Dissenter’s Confession: The Strategy of Economic
Development Revisited, in G.M. Meier and D. Seers ed., Pioneers in
Development (1984).
266 Hence Hirschman’s critique of the “visiting economist’s syndrome,” often
provoked by institutional donors’ demands for speedy diagnosis of and
prescription for economic growth in developing countries. Albert Hirschman, A
Dissenter’s Confession: The Strategy of Economic Development Revisited, in
G.M. Meier and D. Seers ed., Pioneers in Development (1984).
267 For a short general introduction to Hirschman’s role in Latin America, and
the relationship with his theories of economic development, see Ana Maria
Bianchi, Albert Hirschman in Latin America: Notes on Hirschman’s Trilogy on
Economic Development, presented at the 9th annual European Conference on
the History of Economic Thought (Conferencia Europeia de Historia do
Pensamento Economico (ECHE)) (on file with author).
268 See Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (1967).
269 See, e.g., David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972
WISCONSIN L. REV. 720, 737 n.31; David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in SelfEstrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1080.
265
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they tend not to work well.
It suggests that the
transplantation of universals will fail not only because of
differences in normative ideals, but also because of
differences in interests and in practices.
Ultimately, Hirschman himself maintained the
emphasis on the normative. One of his unique contributions
to development analysis was to identify a major shortcoming
in development policy as psychological: “Our diagnosis is
simply that countries fail to take advantage of their
development potential because, for reasons largely related to
their image of change, they find it difficult to take the
decisions needed for development in the required number
and at the required speed.”270
Later, Hirschman would
supplement this psychological analysis with a description of
a “failure complex” that could plague development
policymakers, rooted in part by a rage de vouloir conclure.271
Hirschman’s solution to this problem, however,
retains something of Weber’s sophisticated integration of
material and ideal, normative and nonnormative. Rather
than wait for psychological change to arise independently,
Hirschman advised the establishment of “inducement
mechanisms.” Systems for engineering the interests of
decisionmakers would ensure that “decisions … will be
taken because there is some extra pressure behind them as a
result of pacing, routine responses, threatened penalties,
certain and high profitability, or other forces.”272
While Hirschman’s “social engineering” approach to
development policy ultimately fell prey to criticism as well,
See Albert Hirschman, The Stategy of Economic Development at 25. At
times, hesitation could yield to ambivalence: “While overtly considerable effort
is made in a country to introduce modern methods and techniques, a vague
resentment may yet exist at the same time against the new ways, a secret hope
that the equipment or the methods will not work out….” Hirschman, The
Strategy of Economic Development, at 138.
271 A rage of wanting to be done with it. See Hirschman, Journeys Toward
Progress (1963).
272 Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 27.
270
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its understanding of the importance of environmental
incentives to adopt economic growth strategies evinces a
deeper understanding of Weber’s theory of social change.
Moreover, it is this understanding which ultimately served
as the basis for the later critique of Hirschman and others.
Former World Bank economist David Ellerman, for example,
has concluded that the “social engineering” approach must
fail because, in the end, “both the motivation and the
knowledge are external to the doers.”273
If Rostow’s “extreme” Parsonianism informed U.S.
policy, the more subdued and open-ended approach of
Hirschman and others, such as Gunnar Myrdal274 and Bert
Hoselitz,275 found reflection elsewhere in the U.S. academy,
and also tended to gravitated more towards internationalist
projects. Thus, university centers emerging out of this
period included not only W.W. Rostow’s Center for
International Studies at MIT, but also the more moderate
University of Chicago's Research Center in Economic
Development and Cultural Change and its accompanying
journal Economic Development and Cultural Change.276 The
“Chicago School” of sociology focused on detailing the
complex socioeconomics of development.277 In particular,
these institutions sought to correct “the early mistakes” by
recognizing the “interactive nature of transfer and
development activities.”278
David Ellerman, Rethinking Development Assistance: An Approach Based on
Autonomy-Respecting Assistance, at 2 (on file with author). Indeed, Hirschman
himself has endorsed Ellerman’s work. [cite]

273

274
275

Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer,
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 13-14
277 The Chicago School of sociology features more moderate politics than its
counterpart, the Chicago School of economics, which is known for adopting a
more definitely neoliberal perspective.
278 Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer,
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 13-14 (citing to
276
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Despite the academic prestige and relative influence
of the Moderate Parsonians, their scholarly efforts appear to
have proven relatively less influential than those of the
modernization theorists. According to Paul Krugman, “high
development theory” of this sort failed to gain influence
precisely because it embraced multidisciplinary complexity.
Krugman writes,
Like it or not, the influence of ideas that have not been
embalmed in models soon decays. And this was the fate
of high development theory. . . . By the early 1970s
(when I was a student of economics) [Hirschman and
Myrdal] had come to seem not so much wrong as
meaningless. What were these guys talking about?
Where were the models? And so development theory
was not so much rejected as simply bypassed.279

Despite Krugman’s explanation, Rostow’s equally
unmodeled approach gained influence even while the
Moderate Parsonians waned in theirs: “The most influential
book on economic development to emerge from economic
circles, however, was W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic
Growth. 280 This is ironic, in light of Krugman's analysis, for
…[Rostow's] was not an economistic theory . . . [Rostow's]
economic development required not only appropriate
economic, technological, and demographic conditions, but
also appropriate social institutions and value systems.” 281
Cleveland, H. (1960). The Overseas Americans. New York: McGraw-Hill; Sufrin, S.
C. (1966). Technical Assistance—Theory and Guidelines.; especially Rosen, G. (1985).
Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia, 1950-1970.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Rosenberg, N. (1970). Economic
development and the transfer of technology: Some historical perspectives.
Technology and Culture, 11(3), 550-75. ).
279 Quoted in Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology
Transfer, Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 14.
280 Seely, at 15-16.
281 Seely, at 15-16.
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Perhaps the theoretical simplicity of Rostow’s “unilinear”282
conception of analysis recommended it to development
economists in ways that the theoretical complexity of the
Moderate Parsonians did not.
D. Modernization and Legal Reform: Theory, Policy and
Praxis
D.1. The Law and Development Movement
This same dynamic, whereby the more thoughtful
strains withdrew from the fulcrum of power, characterizes
in part the wax and wane of the “law and development”
movement of the 1970s. This movement originally shared
many of the tenets of modernization theory.
Modernization theory incorporates the notion of a
stable legal order. With respect to economic development,
such a legal system is necessary particularly because it
enables the predictable and effective enforcement of
‘background’ rules necessary for capitalist economic growth,
especially contract and property rights.283
The emphasis within modernization theory of a stable
legal order and the rule of law reflects Weber’s own analysis
of “logically formal rationality” in modern legal systems, as
filtered through Parsonian evolutionary theory.
In his essay “Evolutionary universals in society,”
Parsons argued - Parsons applied Weber’s notion of the
“generalized legal order as the special hallmark of
modernity”284 to recommend legalization as a prescriptive
Seely, at 16.
For a concise exposition of modernization theory, see Kevin Davis & Michael
Trebilcock, What Role Do Legal Institutions Play in Development?, IMF Paper
Series (1999), at p.13.
284 Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in Talcott Parsons, The
Evolution of Societies, at 1, 13 (1977).
282
283
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requirement for modernizing societies :
Law furthers the independence of the normative
components of the societal structure from the exigencies
of political and economic interests …. It is the kind of
law, the institutionalization of which marks the
transition from intermediate to modern societies, that
poses the theoretical problem. Its organization must be
generalized according to universalistic principles. This
requirement precludes such imposing systems as the
Talmudic law or that of traditional Islam from being
classed as modern law. They lack the generality which
Weber called formal rationality.285

Parsons argued that “legalism” is “the major criterion
marking the evolution of societies from ‘intermediate’ to
‘modern’”:286 “[L]aw, when developed to the requisite level,
furthers the independence of the normative components of
the societal structure from the exigencies of political and
economic interests and from the personal, organic, and
physical-environmental
factors
operating
through
them…”287
Thus, law must be “highly generalized
according to universalistic principles.”288
This phrasing, Trubek observed, is “Weberian in
Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives 27
(1966). See also Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, 29 American
Sociological Review 339 (1964). In Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative
Perspectives, Parsons also emphasized the importance of procedure: “Modern
legal systems must also emphasize the factor of procedure, as distinguished from
substantive precepts and standards. Only on the basis of procedural primacy
can the system cope with a variety of changing circumstances and cases without
prior commitment to specific solutions.”
286 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 737 n.31.
287 p.27, Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives
(1966) (cited in David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972
WISCONSIN L. REV. 720, 737 n.31).
288 p.27, Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives
(1966) (cited in David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972
WISCONSIN L. REV. 720, 737 n.31).
285
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inspiration and characteristically Parsonian in its
abstractness.”289 In his analysis of legal reform, as elsewhere
in his work, Parsons transposes Weber’s historical, heuristic
analysis onto the prescriptive frame of modernization
theory.290 By “link[ing] the concept of modernity to societies
that develop autonomous legal orders,” Parsons appears to
“den[y] the possibility of ‘modernization’ without
‘legalism.’” 291
The role of legalization within Parsonian theory
helped to generate the impetus for legal reforms as a part of
U.S. foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century. The “rule
of law” became an important part of the framework
adopted by the U.S. “foreign policy establishment” early in
the post-World War II emergence of the U.S. as a leader in
the international community.292 The question of “legal
development” attracted significant support from the U.S.
government and U.S. foundations from the 1950s onward.293
Legal scholars joined into the already-ongoing efforts of the
David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 737 n.31.
290 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 737 n.31: “Parsons has taken over, at a very superficial level, the
Weberian analysis, but has generalized it to all societies, making the
development of logically formal rationality a criterion of modernity.”
291 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L.
REV. 720, 737 n.31.
292 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1087. See id., p.1067: “Given the political and intellectual climate of
the time, it is no wonder that… ‘[d]evelopment’ was in the air: liberal America
was excited by the prospect of harnessing American knowledge and resources to
the developmental task.” See also Robert A. Packenham, Approaches to the
Study of Political Development, 17 World Politics 108, 109 & n.6 (1964)
(describing the “legal-formal” approach to development to be the “dominant
preoccupation of American political scientists at least until 1950.”)
293 See David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1066 & n.13 (describing the emergence of this support
and leading programs supported by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and non-governmental bodies such as the Ford Foundation).
289
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social science departments in the field.294 These “lawyers
and academics adopted Max Weber’s legalism as the
appropriate model for developing societies.”295
Legal reform efforts tended to focus on two primary
areas. The first was legal education. Training local legal
professionals seemed to go to the heart of the matter, since
such professionals could then go on to design and operate
formal-rational legal systems.296 The legal-education effort
involved academics from elite American law schools
working with governmental and private funding sources to
design programs for the reform of legal training in
developing countries toward the instrumentalist (or realist)
sensibility of American-style “legal liberalism.”297
A second emphasis fell upon judicial reform
specifically. The American model of legalism “celebrated
courts as the core of the legal order.”298 The International
Commission of Jurists, for example, issued a report in 1959
entitled “The Rule of Law in a Free Society,” declaring the
centrality of “individual rights and the administration of
justice in national societies.”299 This body continued to
David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1065 (“The lawyers were latecomers to the development research
game, responding more slowly than social scientists to the demand for
theoretical insights into the processes of development.”)
295 p.199, Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development (1978).
296 See Davis & Trebilcock, at p.14 (“the [law and development] movement
adopted a top-down approach” and “emphasized the reform of legal
education… The assumption was that lawyers trained to use the rule of law as an
instrument for change would promote the development goals of the state.”) See
also David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1075-1076 (“by training lawyers to think more
instrumentally, [law] schools could intiate change that would narrow the gap
between … specific legal rules, doctrines and procedures on the one hand, and
national developmental goals on the other.”)
297 Cf. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1075-1076.
298 ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 199 (1978).
299 International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a Free Society, at
p.326 (1959) (cited in John H. Spencer, Review, Executive Action and the Rule of
Law: A Report on the Proceedings of the International Congress of Jurists, Rio de
294
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study the challenges posed to developing formal systems of
adjudication in developing countries throughout the
1960s.300
The law and development movement translated
modernization theory’s basic approach into the particular
language of the “liberal legalism” of the United States legal
elite. The liberal legalism paradigm adopted the following
general assumptions:
-

It “focused on higher agencies of the legal system” as
opposed to “nonstate forms of legal or other social
ordering”;

-

It “manifested a pervasive belief in the ultimate
efficacy of legal rules as instruments of social
change,” emphasizing the “instrumental relationship
between development goals and specific legal rules”;

-

It “assumed that legal professions were, or could be,
representative of the public interest”; and

-

It “took for granted the existence of some natural
tendency for legal systems in the Third World to
evolve in the direction of [this] ideal model of liberal
legalism.” 301

These assumptions led the assistance effort to “focus on
reform of formal rules, to work with the established
professions, to believe that changes in the educatin of the
Janeiro, 1962, in 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 839, 840 (1967).
300 See, e.g., Executive Action and the Rule of Law: A Report on the Proceedings
of the International Congress of Jurists, Rio de Janeiro, 1962; The Dynamic
Aspects of Rule of Law in the Modern Age: Report o the Proceedings of the
South-East Asian and Pacific Conferences of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand, 1965.
301 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1079.
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professional legal class would ultimately produce desired
social change and, above all, to assume almost automatically
that any activity that was designed to change legal
institutions of Third World countries to make them more
like those of the United States would be an effective and
extremely worthy pursuit.” 302
Law and development reform soon atrophied as a
basis for U.S. intervention, however. One factor was the
theoretical ascendancy of “big push” economic development
theory, which viewed law as purely instrumental to
implement industrialization policies, rather than as an end in
itself.303 Big-push and other economic development theories
of this era found popularity and embrace amongst
developing-country governments.304
Another factor was undoubtedly the waning official
support within the U.S. foreign policy establishment. With
the rise of the Non-Alignment Movement of developing
countries in the 1970s, however, the ability of U.S. foreign
policy to effectuate this kind of law reform waned. In the
Cold War context, with the Soviet Union competing for
alliances, and with the adoption of much of the developing
world of nationalist/socialist government, the attention to
implementing liberal reforms in the domestic legal systems
of developing countries fell away.305
David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1079-1080.
303 Cf. Robert Packenham, Approaches to the Study of Political Development, 17
World Politics 108, 110 (1964) (“one of the most notable characteristics of studies
of the politics of developing areas is how far the pendulum has swung away
from legal-formal to economic, administrative, sociological, and psychological
factors as explanatory variables.”)
302

304

Eric Neumayer, “The infamous Cold War saying, ‘We know they are bastards,
but at least they are our bastards, not theirs,’ which justified much support to
Cold War allies in spite of a bad governance record, fell out of fashion with the
Berlin wall.” Neumayer, at p.1, The Pattern of Aid Giving (2003). [CITE – U.S.
foreign policy during this era was a hodge podge of strategies designed to
305
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D.2. Another Path: Scholars in Self-Estrangement from Law
and Development’s Theoretical Shortcuts
A final cause in the decline of the law and
development movement was a loss of confidence by the
movement’s intellectual authors.
This experiential
transformation is memorably recounted in the essay by
David Trubek & Marc Galanter entitled, “Scholars in SelfWidely read among legal scholars
Estrangement.”306
interested in development, this article described the
misgivings about the law and development movement that
caused its proponents within the legal academy to withdraw
from efforts at programmatic implementation of legal
reforms in developing countries.
Though not described in terms of the “Three
Theoretical Shortcuts” formulation employed here, “Scholars
in Self-Estrangement” nevertheless identified the same set of
conceptual shortcomings in the law and development
framework.
“Theoretical Shortcut #1 (“One-Size-Fits-All”).
Trubek and Galanter explained at length the
problems arising from the universalizing assumptions in
“liberal legalism’s model of law in society.”307
Where “liberal legalism” assumed “social and
contain the Soviet Union: seeking explicitly or clandestinely to overturn socialist
governments such as those in Chile and Guatemala, tolerating nationalist, statist
and totalitarian regimes where they were open to alliance with the U.S., such as
that in Egypt. U.S. advocacy of liberal legal values tended to limit itself to
disputes arising in an explicitly transnational context, such as nationalizations of
property owned by foreign investors.]
306

David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1080.
307
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political pluralism,” Trubek & Galanter found instead
“social stratification and class cleavage” in “most of the
Third World.”308 Where liberal legalism assumed that “rules
reflect the interests of the vast majority of citizens and are
normally internalized by them,” the authors found instead
that “rules are imposed on the many by the few and are
frequently honored much more in the breach than in the
observance.” 309 Where liberal legalism assumed that “courts
are central actors in social control, and that they are
relatively autonomous,” instead “in many nations courts are
neither very independent nor very important.” 310
Trubek and Galanter’s continued engagement with
the model of liberal legalism caused them to “doubt that the
model accurately describes legal life even in the United
States.” 311 Rather than “general” rules, “many of the rules”
David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1080.
309 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1081.
310 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1081. An related critique from the authors’ colleague Bob Seidman
came from the perception that courts had become marginal in the process of
instrumentalizing and implementing development measures. Robert Seidman
observed in the context of African judicial reform, for example, that even those
courts that had taken on characteristics of the rule of law “barely involved
themselves in development,” instead focusing on the settlement of private
disputes.310 Though this role would probably suffice in today’s understanding of
the relationship of the judiciary to law and development, the view of that time of
law-in-action appeared to contemplate a more active judicial role in the
ambitious industrialization policies of the era. “Institutions that can impose only
punishments with rigid, complex, and slow procedures, that can only institute
incremental change, subject to rules in legalese, always at overload, and lacking
expertise to deal with technical matters, will not implement many development
rules. Those characterize at best, rule-applying institutions not problem-solving
ones.
Development, however, required change-oriented, problem-solving
institutions to induce new behavior in a wide range of clients. The efforts of
lawyers to ensure that the courts systems of Africa matched the ideal-type
demanded by the Rule of Law missed the mark of development.” Seidman,
State Law and Development, at 218.
311 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1081.
308
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in U.S. law “originate from, and primarily serve, specific
groups”; and moreover “those who apply rules have
substantial discretion… to favor certain groups and
viewpoints.” 312 Similarly, the “centrality of the courts is also
largely mythical” in light of the fact that “regulatory activity
and the promulgation of rules take place mostly in other
settings.”313
In adopting this universalistic paradigm, liberal
legalism employed a “one-size-fits-all” approach assumed
the desirability of a single set of reform goals. In addition to
being “ethnocentric,”314 such an approach was also
“naïve”315 in that perilously ignored important differences
across societies that could jeopardize particular reform
efforts.316
Theoretical Shortcut #2: The Determinism of Values.
On its face, the model of liberal legalism focused on
implementing specific institutional reforms through the
courts and legal education. Although it did not explicitly
prioritize a shift in values, it certainly envisioned that a
general shift towards rationally instrumental thinking and
behavior would flow from its reforms.317 Moreover, such
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1081.
314 Id. at 1080. The charge of ethnocentricity was also implied in Unger’s critique
of the conception of logically formal rationality in law as essential to modernity
as a particularistic result of specific history of Europe. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW
IN MODERN SOCIETY, Chapter 3 (1977).
315 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1080.
316 Based on this account, the assumptions of the law and development
movement may also have misapprehended the logic internal to their own
theoretical precursors in modernization theory, in that it appeared to assume
that the very social phenomena that it was trying to create – courts, highly skilled
and publicly-interested legal professionals – were already sufficiently in place as
to be able to aid in the application of reform efforts.
317 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1075 (“by training lawyers to think more instrumentally, the schools
could initiate change that would narrow the gap between the present
312
313
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reforms would further the “ultimate values” (in Parsonian
terms) of “liberty, equality, participation and rationality.”318
Trubek and Galanter noticed and objected to a more
subtle normative dynamic within this framework: the
identification
of
practices
that
constituted
“counterinstances” to the “paradigm” to be “labell[ed] as
deviant and therefore ‘bad.’”319 Trubek and Galanter stop
short of the charge that the prioritization of instrumental and
ultimate values reflective of the liberal legal paradigm as
“good” and marginalization of others as “bad” amounted to
a judgment that Third World societies were underdeveloped
because of “bad values.”
In making the charge of
“ethnocentrism,” however, Trubek and Galanter go some
ways towards implying this very dynamic. The “bad
values” upshot of “value determinism” would resurface
more explicitly in the much later writings of Good
Governance Scholars.320
Theoretical Shortcut #3: Correlation between
modernity and democracy. The “most serious” defect of
liberal legalism in the law and development movement,
according to Trubek and Galanter, was its failure to
recognize that “the formal neutrality of the legal system is
not incompatible with the use of law as a tool to further
domination by elite groups.”321 The law and development
movement began by believing that its reform efforts would
“While the
necessarily promote democratic goals.322
performance of the legal profession and its developmental possibilities”).
318 Id. at 1076.
319 Id. at 1082.
320

David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1083.
322 Id. at 1064: “Legal development assistance was originally justified as a
rational and effective method to protect individual freedom, expand citizen
participation in decisionmaking, enhance social equality, and increase the
capacity of all citizens rationally to control events and shape social life.”
321
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assistance agencies consistently maintained that the legal
development projects they supported were achieving these
goals, many scholars began to wonder….” 323
The
disproportionate access of the wealthy to the legal system,
and the “natural” conservatism of the legal professions,
often seemed to undermine rather than to further the
processes of democratic change.324
This realization reflects the Theoretical Shortcut of
simplifying the relationship between modernization and
democracy. As Trubek and Galanter found, the process is
far from straightforward. Rather, and bearing out Weber’s
initial analyses, it may require concerted effort against the
process of legal rationalization and its accompanying
entrenchment of bureaucratic hierarchy.
E. The Revival of “Law and Development”: The Good
Governance Era
During the 1970s, legal reform as a focus of
development discourse entered into a phase of dormancy.
The withdrawal of law and development scholars from legal
reform efforts, coupled with the geopolitical and economic
dynamics of international relations during that era,325 chilled
efforts by the U.S. foreign policy establishment to achieve
the “rule of law” as part of modernization in developing
countries.
With the deep economic contractions that wracked
David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1064.
324 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN
L. REV. 1062, 1084.
325 Among these dynamics were the relative ascendancy of the developing world
signaled by the Non-Aligned Movement and the OPEC oil strikes, and the
accompanying bid by many developing-country governments to reorder
international law to accommodate nationalist-socialist economic and legal
systems.
323
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many leading developing country governments in the early
1980s, the era of reconciliation of the developing world to
the liberal vision began. The 1980s saw the emergence of the
“Washington consensus:” endorsement of economic
liberalization shared by the U.S. government and by such
international financial institutions as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The IMF, the World
Bank, and the GATT were during this period able to procure
agreement from developing country governments to
fundamental policy shifts in the direction of traditional
liberalism.
The IMF and World Bank policies of
“conditionality” of funds on “structural adjustment,” such as
liberalizing trade and investment policy, privatizing stateowned economic actors, and reducing social spending, were
joined by the commencement of negotiations that would
result ultimately in the reinforcement of trade liberalization
through the establishment of the World Trade
Organization.326
It was during this period of reconciliation of the
developing world to the liberal vision327 that the focus of the
“foreign policy establishment” began to shift back to law
reform. “Good governance” policy articulated the legal and
administrative dimensions of this larger set of liberalization
reforms. 328
In its “first generation” of reforms, good governance
policy focused primarily on the reform of the legal and
regulatory systems for the administration of private law and
public fiscal and financial law.329 This reform would be
achieved, first, by bringing such systems into compliance
[cite AM U ILR article]
[Haggard calls this Deep Integration]
328 James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa's Economic
And Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities In Legal Outcomes
Between Markets And States, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 971, 1000-1001 (2000).
329 I employ the terminology of Kerry Rittich’s The Future of Law and
Development, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 199, 206 (2004).
326
327
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with an internationally established code of “best practices,”
creating regularization both domestically and internationally
through the transnational harmonization according to such
practices.330 Second, such reforms would be achieved by
emphasizing accountability and transparency within these
harmonized systems.
In particular, “anti-corruption”
reforms would ensure systemic allegiance to the principle of
the rule of law.331
In this initial iteration, “good governance” policy
explicitly avoided the realm of democratic politics, on the
grounds that the expertise of the advising institutions was
merely “economic”’ and not “political.”332 The “second
generation” of good governance reforms, however, has
recognized this distinction as a false one: good governance
policy now explicitly recognizes the importance of
democratic participation in governance reform, particularly
through the incorporation of “civil society” into the decisionmaking and reform process.333

The Connection Between Weberian Thought and Good
Governance Policy
One of the leading architects of contemporary good
governance theory, Ibrahim Shihata, explicitly articulated its
Weberian intellectual heritage in essays such as The World
Bank and “Governance” Issues in Its Borrowing Members.334
330
331
332
333

See Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and “Governance” Issues in its Borrowing
Members, in 1 The World in a Changing World 53 (1991); see also Ibrahim
Shihata, Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing Members – The Extent of Their
334
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Alvaro Santos has observed that in arguing that “good
governance” primarily meant the “rule of law,” Shihata
“referred to Weber’s ideal type of ‘logically formal
rationality’… in a modern state as conducive to economic
growth.”335
This application of Weberian theory also revealed the
indebtedness of Shihata and others to a particular
understanding of it, that of the modernization theorists as
inherited from Talcott Parsons. The conversion of Weber’s
historical discussion to a prescriptive formula, and the focus
of that formula on a single, universal solution to the
challenge of economic development, bore the distinctive
imprint of modernization theorists.336 Indeed, the focus on
abstracting governance “functions” from political and
societal contexts is part of the Parsonian inheritance of
“global governance” scholarship more generally.337
It is the objective of this paper to argue that these
concerns stem not just from ad hoc formulations of the actors
and agencies involved.
Rather, the specific kinds of
shortcomings identified by the Good Governance are
intrinsically linked to the theoretical and analytical
framework
bequeathed
by
Parsonian
StructuralFunctionalism and of Modernization Theory. The remainder
of this section shows how the concerns raised by the Good
Governance Scholars track the Three Theoretical Shortcuts
Relevance under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, in The World Bank Legal Papers
245, 268 (2000). I am indebted to Alvaro Santos for his investigation of these
sources and their link to Weberian theory. See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s
Uses of the ‘Rule of Law’ Promise in Economic Development, in Kennedy & Trubek
eds., at 216, 229-234.
335 See Santos, supra, at 230.
336 Cf. James Gathii, James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on
Africa's Economic And Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities
In Legal Outcomes Between Markets And States, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 971, 1000-1002
(2000).
337 Robert Latham, Politics in a Floating World: Toward a Critique of Global
Governance, in Martin Hewson & Timothy Sinclair eds., APPROACHES TO GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE THEORY 23, 31-35 (1999).
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traced in the foregoing genaeology.
Theoretical Shortcut #1: One-Size-Fits-All
The tendency of good governance policy to produce a
single set of recommended reforms, regardless of political or
social context, has generated wide-ranging concerns
amongst Good Governance Scholars. In a discussion of the
IMF-sponsored drive towards “building a legal architecture
for global markets” through the “harmonization of law
around the globe by way of developing legal standards,” for
example, Katerina Pistor “questions the assumption that
legal harmonization will result in the improvement of legal
institutions.”338 Addressing standardization initiatives across
several areas of law including “accounting, auditing,
bankruptcy, corporate governance, insurance regulation and
securities market regulation,”339 Pistor notes that the desire
standardization effort arises out of the desire to achieve
efficiency through increased certainty and uniformity.340
Pistor notes the crucial downside of such efforts, however:
“Even if it were possible to design the perfect law or to
develop the best standards for a particular area of the law,
the incorporation of this law into a domestic legal system is
per se not a guarantee for it to become effective.”341
Noting the “interdependence of legal rules and the
p.1, Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on
Developing Economies, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, Research Paper for the
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs,
No.4, June 2000, United Nations.
339 P.3, Pistor Paper. Examples were guidelines developed by the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) including its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and the
OECD including its Principles of Corporate Governance. See id.
340 Pistor paper at 4.
341 Pistor paper at 5.
338
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characteristic of law as a ‘cognitive institution,’”342 Pistor
concludes that “the process of law-making, the compatibility
of the new rules with pre-existing ones as well as with given
economic and political conditions, and the existence of
constituencies with a demand for these rules is more
important than the contents of the supplied rules.”343 The
general quality of harmonized legal standards leaves open
many
questions
that
must
then
be
resolved
particularistically. For example, the OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance do not specify the appropriate means
for resolving conflicts between shareholders and other
“stakeholders.”344 Proposals for securities harmonization
assume a political system and governance framework
compatible with such liquid capital markets.345 In these and
numerous other ways, the harmonization effort only
prompts, rather than resolves, the political and institutional
challenges associated with governance in a particular
context. Since standardized provisions can only acquire
meaning “by relating them to pre-existing legal concepts, or
interpreting them from scratch… the process of
standardization defeats its very purpose.”346 Ultimately,
Pistor “warns against viewing legal standards as a panacea
for building effective legal systems around the world.”347
The importance of contextually specific analysis and
application emerges as one of the conclusions of Kevin Davis
and Michael Trebilcock in their sweeping review of
empirical studies of the relationship between legal reform
and economic development. Davis and Trebilcock note that
the empirical data, though far from conclusive and
Pistor paper at 8.
Pistor paper at 5.
344 Pistor paper at 14 (considering employee codetermination and affiliated
owners).
345 Pistor paper at 12.
346 Pistor paper at 17.
347 Pistor paper at 17.
342
343
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methodologically potentially questionable,348 do suggest a
“weak” correlation between some of the major tenets of
“good governance” reform such as establishing a formal
system for contract enforcement.349 The authors caution,
however, that the application of this tenet, as with many
others in legal reform projects, through exclusive emphasis
on judicial and court reform runs the risk of ignoring other
modalities of governance that may be equally important in a
given context.350
Equally importantly, legal reform projects too often,
in the opinion of the authors, ignore the far more challenging
step of translating such broad policies into concrete
administrative support.351 The focus of legal reforms on
establishing particular content, such as contract enforcement,
and obtaining general qualities, such as transparency, too
often somehow overlooks the extensive and fine-grained
overhaul of local administrative technologies required to
achieve such objectives.352
See infra, referring to the subjective assessments that form the basis of many
of these studies.
349 See Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, What Role Do Legal Institutions Play
in Development?, IMF Paper Series 52 (1999) (“There is no conclusive evidence
one way or another on the relative efficiency of informal and formal methods of
contract enforcement. However, at the aggregate level the available evidence
weakly supports some broad generalizations.”)
350 See id. At 9 (concluding generally that “an exclusive or predominant
preoccupation with the court system inappropriately discounts the important
role played by government departments and agencies and specialized
administrative or regulatory bodies in the administration and enforcement of
laws”).
348

See id. (“the much more daunting challenge has proven to be that of
enhancing the quality of institutions charged with the responsibility for enacting
laws and regulations and institutions charged with the subsequent
administration and/or enforcement of those laws or regulations.”).
352 Cf. Chantal Thomas, Transfer of Technology in the Contemporary
International Order, 22 Fordham International Law Journal 2096 (1999)
(discussing contemporary reforms in international intellectual property and
environmental law and concluding that “broad areas persist in which the Bretton
Woods model for technology transfer falls short, and in which greater oversight
351
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Theoretical Shortcut #2: The Determinism of “Values”
Good Governance Scholars have also questioned the
degree to which contemporary legal reform projects may
unwittingly be assuming that poor countries remain so
because of inappropriate values. Such questions have been
raised in particular about the “anti-corruption” wing of good
governance reform efforts.
Through a Weberian lens, the anti-corruption focus
can be understood as a desire to bring the state more into
conformity with the goal of formal rationalism. Corruption
distorts the rational decision-making processes of the state
by serving individual interests at the expense of efficient and
transparent administration. As such, the beneficial impact of
reducing corruption in government is self-evident.
Critics of anti-corruption reforms have charged,
however, that in effect they are expressions of a belief that
people in poor countries have irrational values or corrupt
values. James Gathii, for example, has detailed extensively
the way in which “[g]ood governance accounts demonstrate a
significant distrust of African leadership.”353 Gathii provides an
historical genaeology of conceptions by modern Western
theorists of Africa as irrational and immoral.354 Such
simplistic assumptions about the “inherent” values of
Western versus non-Western cultures can, in turn, lead to an
inability to perceive corruption in the West.355
of technology transfer is needed even in a liberalized regime. Paradoxically,
some of these areas arise out of the very changes in the international economic
order that eliminated the old technology transfer model. These changes have
created implementation costs and a general need for technology necessary to
administer increased international trade, finance, information, and intellectual
property flows.”)
353 Gathii, supra, at 1008.
354 Gathii, supra, at 975-985.
355 David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 Conn. J. Int’l L.
455 (1999) (summarizing concerns about anti-corruption, inter alia, as follows:
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This value determinism leads to a self-reinforcing
perception amongst development analysts. Poor countries
are assumed to have irrational values and informal
governance, and their irrational values and informal
governance are then assumed to cause their poverty. This
circularity is a serious flaw in the methodology of much
good governance reform analysis. This work produces
“quantitative” or “empirical” studies of the relationship
between the rule of law or corruption, on the one hand, and
economic growth, on the other; but the assessments of rule
of law or corruption in the measured countries are often
based on subjective judgments. 356 In particular, the World
Bank’s Governance Indicators, which are widely read and
widely applied in the Bank’s own policy work,357 are drawn
from surveys of individual persons’ perceptions.358 While
recent studies have endeavored to broaden the geographical
sourcing for such surveys, the majority of the perceptions
First, the claim that the anti-corruption campaign is the product of a double
standard by the West against the rest - the normal lobbying and campaign
financing practices of Washington law firms are seen as corruption when
undertaken by members of leading families of Pakistan or Indonesia. Second, the
anti-corruption campaign puts pressure on public practices in the Third World
which are no different from the private practices of individuals and corporations
in the First World. Imelda Marcos's shoes are a scandal, but Bill Gates' house is
simply part of the idiosyncratic lifestyle of the rich and famous.”)
356 See, e.g., Davis & Trebilcock, supra, at 53 (“The difficulty with those studies
[on formal contract enforcement and economic growth] is that they all rely upon
subjective assessments of the likelihood of government repudiation of contracts
and the overall level of law and order….”).
measures of the effectiveness with which contracts are enforced.”).
357 See Alvaro Santos, supra.
358 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters
IV:
Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank, May 2005) (presenting
“aggregate governance indicators” measuring “i) Voice and Accountability; ii)
Political Instability and Violence; iii)
Government Effectiveness; iv) Regulatory Quality; v) Rule of Law, and, vi)
Control of
Corruption” for “209 countries and territories,” and based “individual variables
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources
constructed by 31 different organizations”).
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measured still originate from Western countries.359
Related to the idea that people in poor countries have
irrational or corrupt values is the idea that Western systems
have become successful due to superior values, an
imperialist overtone in some anti-corruption efforts.360 This
leads to a lack of respect for local ways of doing things and
local values, on the assumption that such ways are
inherently flawed.361
One result can be reforms and
processes that ignore local considerations and therefore are
perceived as illegitimate.
When combined with an
insufficient attention to power dynamics, the result can be
disastrous as discussed below.362 Also related to the idea
that people in poor countries have irrational or corrupt
values is the idea that development can only after such
values have changed.363 As the Rostovian and culture and
development perspectives described above suggest, the
single biggest requirement for development in poor societies
is that the culture embraces the “Protestant” values required
for capitalistic economic growth.
This critique picks up on the relationship between
normative and non-normative interests discussed above. To
be sure, Weber in the Protestant Ethic described valuerational behavior associated with Calvinism as critical in
producing the phenomenon of American capitalism. The
idea that the West succeeded economically because it had
superior values is probably most commonly associated with
Weber’s work in Protestant Ethic. As the discussion above
indicates, however, Weber’s understanding of social action
and governance, including their manifestations in the
Id.
See, e.g., Lawrence Harrison, Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: The Latin
American Case (1985).
361 See for example the literature relating to “informal” contract enforcement
mechanisms, e.g., in Trebilcock & Davis at 50-53.
362 Infra discussion of privatization cases.
363 See Harrison, supra.
359
360
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modern West, was ultimately more complex. To begin with,
according to one of his biographers, Weber himself explicitly
rejected the idea of cultural inferiority, and criticized the
Social Darwinists of his day who sought to explain
differences in levels of development across societies in such
terms.364
Defenders of good governance policy would
undoubtedly argue that the charges of cultural imperialism
misunderstand the project, and align themselves with
Weber’s egalitarianism on this point. Just as Weber pointed
out that certain values were more amenable to capitalism
from a descriptive rather than normative point of view, any
endorsement of values in good governance policy would
presumably be understood as purely instrumentalist:
adopted for their productive effects rather than for their
normative superiority.
The critique of cultural imperialism is not only that it
focuses on so-called Western values above others, but also
that it focuses on values at the expense of other dynamics
that play a role in development.
Social action is
characterized by material interests as well as ideals, and
value-rational behavior is only one kind of social action.
Consequently, development – including the development of
law and administration through “good governance” –
requires much more than a shift in values.
This critique reflects the elision of material interests in
364 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 35

(1996): “[Weber] assumed that there could be no transcendant standard by which
cultures could be judged superior and inferior.” As an example of this view
Diggins cites Weber’s statement in his essay on “Churches and Sects” regarding
Mormons and Indians in Utah: “[O]ne person may assert that the… material and
other accomplishments and characteristics which the Mormons brought there
and developed are a proof of the superiority of the Mormons over the Indians,
while another person … may prefer the desert and the romantic existence of the
Indians. No science of any kind can purport to be able to dissuade these persons
from their respective views.” Aside from its romanticism of the Indians, this
statement appears to be a fairly strong version of cultural relativism rather than
cultural imperialism.
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the streamlined version of Weberian and post-Weberian
thought. Would Weber himself support an idea that values
have to shift in order for development to be attained? Weber
did not approach his study of non-Western societies with a
reformer’s eye. His objective was to provide accurate and
analytical description, rather than prescription. Weber did,
however, concern himself with the economic development of
his native Germany. Indeed, after writing the Protestant
Ethic Weber expressed strong misgivings about the ability of
Germany to compete with the industrious Americans.365
In proposing a course of action for Germany,
however, Weber never suggested that Calvinist values be
transposed.
Rather, he sought to identify concrete
institutional reforms that might have the effect of spurring
German society into more effective growth through the
strengthening of the bourgeoisie. The proposed reforms did
not seek to replicate the institutional and legal characteristics
of American society, but rather were designed to address
what Weber saw as the specific weaknesses of German
society – the overweening power of the executive and the
relative influence of the quasi-feudal agrarian elite.366
In this vein, good governance reforms might be said
to do the same: propose institutional reforms that can help to
create an “entrepreneurial class.” Weber was an avowed
supporter of the bourgeoisie, and certainly the focus within
modernization theory and good governance policy on the
“capitalist” nucleus rightfully claims a Weberian pedigree.
Yet Weber’s own thoughts about how to generate such
activity in his home country showed that he rejected both (1)
the idea that a shift in values was necessary, and that (2) the
system of the model country could be unproblematically
transplanted. In this sense Weber rejected some of the
tendencies of the discourses discussed above. Although he
365
366

[CITE]
[CITE]
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was frustrated by the “values” of the Junkers, for example,
Weber did not prescribe a shift in values but rather
institutional mechanisms designed to counterbalance the
influence of the Junkers – such as, direct election of the
President by the people instead of the legislature.
This is, in fact, the objective of good governance
reform. Where good governance can continue to improve in
achieving its stated objectives, therefore, would be to avoid
sliding into a simplistic one-size-fits-all approach on the one
hand, or to slip into simplistic value-deterministic approach,
on the other.
A final upshot of “value determinism” lies in the
centrality of the entrepreneurial class to governance models
of development. While a focus on the entrepreneurial class
characterizes
both
Weber’s
thought
and
the
modernization/good governance approach, one speculates
whether Weber’s awareness of the role of material
conditions might have caused him to doubt whether legal
reform should be the focus of development policy. Weber
simply did not address the question of how materially
underdeveloped societies might achieve industrialization
however (his sole reform project being Germany).
Contemporary good governance reform picks up the
emphasis of modernization theory on creating a “capitalist
nucleus,” in particular through multinational corporations
and foreign direct investment.367 The critiques of this focus
are multilayered. Some empirical data show support for the
hypothesized positive relationship between capital inflows
and foreign direct investment, on the one hand, and growth,
on the other.368 The associated dynamics and distributional
consequences of this dynamic, nevertheless, have led to
See Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993), at pp.4-5.
368 P.115-117, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993).
367
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widespread “discontent” with modernization theory in the
developing world.369 Inflows of foreign direct investment
correlate with higher levels of external debt, official aid and
military assistance, suggesting that a “client-state”
relationship of sorts may be necessary to attract and support
these inflows.370
In the context of “Washington-consensus” structural
adjustments such as privatization, for example, private
foreign direct investment in privatized state assets often
floats on a wide range of support from interested
governments (e.g., the political risk insurance provided by
the U.S. to its nationals through OPIC) and international
organizations (e.g., the loan guarantees provided by the IMF
to such investors through MIGA). Such supports enable
foreign direct investment to occur but are also accompanied
by formal371 and informal372 conditionalities shaping the
policies and terms structuring such investment. are [support
with dissection of privatization relationship and IMF
guarantees] This clustering effect of ties to foreign
economies may produce the experience of impaired
sovereignty that Rittich, for example, has observed as a
critique of good governance reforms.373
The “capitalist nucleus” dynamic appears to operate
on an even more fundamental bias, that of the size of the
host economy: such capital inflows tends to favor economies
that already have some minimal level of capital formation.
Pp.117-122, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993).
370 Pp.117-122, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993).
371 The policy of conditionality.
372 Technical assistance and advice. See, e.g., Rittich, The Future of Law and
Development, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 199, 206 (2004) (describing both conditionality
and a “variety of other soft mechanisms to promote the reforms that they
regarded as optimal… from technical advice…; thematic reports and policy
prescriptions…; and empirical research.”).
373 Pp.210-211 & 231-232, Rittich, The Future of Law and Development, 26 Mich.
J. Int’l L. 199 (2004).
369
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Consequently, those countries “that have the greatest need
for external capital sources due to their relatively lesser
ability to generate capital domestically are the most unlikely
to obtain” it.374 According to one analyst, Bret Billet in a
1993 study, the beneficiaries from this “circle of prosperity”
are relatively few.375 Consequently, modernization-theorybased measures such as structural adjustment and
associated good governance reforms may serve to “enlarge
the gap between the richest and the poorest” of countries.376
If only a relative difference in economic growth, an
enlarging gap need not undermine the case for Washingtonconsensus reform. Where the gap reflects an absolute
decline, as apparently characterizes some countries, the
cause for concern becomes much greater.377
There are a number of flaws in good governance
lending. The first is the methodology of how “good
governance” is computed. For example, the World Bank
relies too much on opinion surveys, allowing for the
possibility that subjective impressions – and biases -- are
reproduced in assessment criteria. [cite Kaufman study]
More disturbing from the perspective of good governance
advocates is the suggestion of recent empirical data
compiled by Eric Neumayer that funding appears to track
“donor interest” – as measured, for example, by the export
interest of donor-country nationals and by political ties,378 at
Pp.121, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993).
375 Pp.121, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993).
376 Pp.122, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development:
Discontent in the Developing World (1993).
377 See Chantal Thomas, Am U ILR discussion of relative versus absolute
inequality amongst countries, noting that some Eastern European countries and
sub-Saharan African countries have experienced an absolute decline in some
income and quality of life indicators.
378 Neumayer, at pp.97 (concluding that although “recipient need” as measured
by poverty levels proved significant in determining “aid eligibility,” donor
interests such as “colonial experience” and “economic interests in the form of
374
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least as much as “good governance” criteria such as
adherence to the rule of law or low levels of corruption.379
The same study found that, of all the potential criteria for
measuring good governance, “low regulatory burden”
proved to be the only consistently significant correlative to
aid levels.380
Despite the nominal value assigned to democracy and
respect for human rights, these factors were, by contrast,
indeterminate or insignificant in determining aid levels.381
These empirical findings seem to support similar
conclusions from Billet’s study of a decade earlier that
political and economic interests “cluster” around and
ultimately drive such programs. They also support the
intuition voiced by critics of good governance that marketoriented reforms continue to trump democratic reforms,
notwithstanding the formal inclusion of the latter in
contemporary good governance assessments.382 Finally,
such findings underscore the general concern that recipient
countries continue to be rewarded for implementing “one
size fits all” economic policies, rather than for adopting more
specific institutional reforms related to participatory and
non-corrupt decision-making.383
exports and military-strategic interests” proved more significant in determining
the level of “good governance” aid).
379 Neumayer found that “[l]ow corruption and respect for the rule of law are
basically irrelevant” in determining good governance aid flows. Neumayer at
p.82.
380 p.97 Neumayer.
381 P.97 Neumayer (finding that such criteria determined initial aid eligibility but
not aid levels).
382 See Thomas, Does Good Governance Privilege Markets at the Expense of
Democracy?; Rittich, The Future of Law and Development at 224-225.
383 Rittich, The Future of Law and Development, at 224-225 (“Although one of
the touchstones of second generation reforms is the rejection of a one-size-fits-all
template for development and the importance of wider participation in the
formulation of development goals, there is surprisingly little diversity in either
the discourse or the prescriptions about the legal reforms needed for
development.”)
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Theoretical Shortcut #3: The Correlation Between
Modern Capitalism and Democracy.
Although good governance reforms have recently
begun to emphasize the importance of participation by civil
society, some Good Governance Scholars have observed that
much remains in the way of implementation.384 Good
governance programs too often maintain a dual and selfreinforcing narrowness of focus: substantively on promoting
the interests of the investors as opposed to other
stakeholders in economic growth; and institutionally in
maintaining a top-down, “one-size-fits-all” approach. The
preceding two sections suggested that these two
shortcomings flow from the Theoretical Shortcuts intrinsic to
the analytical framework supporting good governance
policy.
This section argues that the dangers that flow
from this self-reinforcing narrowness are insufficiently
perceived due to an overly casual assumption about the
natural correlation between modern bureaucracy, capitalism,
and democracy.385
A striking example of this would be the World Bank’s
recent experiences with privatization of water utilities in
Latin America, and especially in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The
strategy implemented a “one-size-fits-all” program of
privatization rooted in the Washington consensus.386 The
focus of such programs has ostensibly been to improve
water delivery in poor countries, reducing the inefficiency of
existing government utilities and advancing progress
towards the Millennium Development Goal of improved
access to potable water.
In practice, however, the privatizations often focused
See, e.g., Rittich, supra.
Amy Chua has made this point with respect to the rights of ethnic minorities
in developing economies, in her book World on Fire.
384
385

386

See, e.g., World Bank, Strategic Directions for World Bank Engagement
(2003); World Bank, Water Resources Management (1993).
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on protecting the interests of investors, to the (perhaps
unintended) exclusion of other stakeholders and especially
of consumers. Thus, the World Bank was able to employ its
formidable resources to offer political risk guarantees and
below-market loans to make such privatizations attractive
for investors.
From
the
modernization-cum-good-governance
perspective, such a program may not have raised red flags
because of the policy shortcomings that arise from the
Theoretical Shortcuts. First, privatization was accepted as a
universally desirable and effective legal reform. Second, an
emphasis may have been placed on the interests of investors
over other stakeholders on the theory that this emphasis
would unleash the “capitalistic spirit” necessary to trigger
economic growth. Finally, no deliberate assessment of the
role of democratic participation was made, perhaps because
of an insufficient sensitivity to the role of power and
coercion in modern bureaucratic governance.
Had local consumers been consulted in advance, an
awareness of the implausibility of the Bolivia privatization
might have surfaced. Proponents might have realized that
the projected prices for privatized water services far
exceeded the price points at which consumers were willing
to pay, particularly those for whom the new water service
would require a third or more of their monthly salaries.387
Moreover, proponents might have realized that land claims
to local water sources were contested. Because none of these
assessments were made, the Bolivia water privatization
proceeded as planned but soon encountered radical
resistance on the part of the local population, leading to the
cancellation of the privatization contract and embroiling the
Bank in controversy. Unfortunately, the experience with
Bolivia resembles those of other recent water privatizations
387

Public Citizen, Water Privatization Fiascoes: Broken Promises and Social
Turmoil (2003).
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throughout the developing world.388
The disastrous experience with water privatizations
indicates the danger of insufficiently incorporating local
participation and local information into the development
policymaking process. Recently, good governance policy
has sought to correct this imbalance by explicitly
incorporating “civil society.” Good Governance Scholars
such as Kerry Rittich, have argued that such recent reforms
have taken place more on the surface than in practice.389
PART III. Conclusions and Prospects For Reform
David Ellerman, a former World Bank economist, has
sought to incorporate many of these insights into a new
approach to development policy, which he entitles
“Autonomy Respecting Development.”
Ellerman has
argued that “social engineering” approaches to development
are destined to fail: “problems in the social engineering
approach are endemic. Sustainable transformation towards
developmental ends needs to be based on motives that come
out of the doers' own internal values—and knowledge needs
to be grounded on the doers' own learning experiences.”390
Following the observations related to the three
Theoretical
Shortcuts,
such
“autonomy-respecting
development” should: (1) avoid the “one-size-fits-all”
approach by carefully considering local context; (2) avoid the
“determinism of values” by eschewing implicit cultural
imperialism, understanding the role of material conditions
and “nonnormative interest” in affecting outcomes, and
balancing the interests of investors with those of other
388

Id.

389

Rittich, The Future of Law and Development, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 199 (2004).
390 Ellerman, Autonomy-Respecting Development.

113

RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

stakeholders; and (3) incorporate an awareness of the role of
coercion in modern governance, and the non-automaticity of
democracy therein, by specifically seeking out local
participation.
Good governance reforms are already moving in this
direction. Policy documents by the World Bank increasingly
emphasize the importance of context and local capacitybuilding. They also recognize the importance of engaging
economic groups beyond investors. Finally, they have
moved towards institutionalizing more participatory
decision-making.
The World Bank Inspection Panel exemplifies all three
kinds of insights. The Inspection Panel allows local groups
to identify specific grievances relating to World Bank
sponsored development projects. The Panel could be better
institutionalized, however; currently it is ad hoc, dependent
on a petition rather than an automatic part of the process; it
frequently occurs after the development project has already
been completed; and it often serves only an advisory
function. Improvements would come from including this
kind of information-gathering as an automatic and central
part of the formulation of local development projects.
The solutions offered by Ellerman, the Inspection
Panel, and the Good Governance Scholars will be noticeably
more redistributive (or at least multi-distributive) than the
policies offered by the Rostovians and Parsonians.
Ultimately, the proposed differences in distributional
consequences cannot escape an underlying debate on
political economy. There simply is a difference of opinion
about the relative value of participatory, redistributive
development policy, and therefore about the relative values
of legal reforms designed towards that end.
Moreover, all of these approaches disregard
sovereignty, in the traditional sense of the term to mean the
recognition of a unitary, unconstrained state. In different
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ways, all of these approaches situate themselves within a
contemporary “global governance” framework, in which
law and policy arises out of the interaction between multiple
institutional and social planes.
Finally, these suggested reforms do not necessarily
reflect what Weber himself might have recommended, if he
were writing on international political economy today.
Rather, they represent an attempt to put “Weberian wheels”
back on the right track in law and development.391

See Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or
Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western
Legal Thought, supra, at 1076.
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